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INTRODUCTION 
 
In March 2007, the United States Coast Guard sailors boarded a 
suspicious Panamanian vessel that had been spotted by an overhead 
surveillance plane.1 The boarding resulted in the largest maritime cocaine 
seizure ever  a massive 42,000 pounds uncut. Eleven crewmembers were 
arrested, brought to Florida, and indicted.   
 
Yet the seizure did not take place in U.S. territorial waters, or even the 
broader U.S. customs zone. It took place in Panamanian waters.2 
Moreover, none of the crew – now facing decades or life in U.S. jails – were 
Americans. Finally, there was no evidence that the drugs, seized over a 
thousand miles from Miami, were destined to the U.S. Indeed, the DEA 
conceded the drugs were bound for a third country. 
 
This case, while exceptional in the amount seized, is otherwise not 
unusual. It repeats itself dozens of times each year, as the U.S. begins to 
enforce its own drug laws in foreign territory. The wisdom or propriety of 
such action as a matter of drug policy, international relations, or even 
international law is not the subject of this Article. Rather, the question here 
is which of Congress’s enumerated powers authorize it to regulate such 
purely foreign conduct? 
 
The international law doctrine of universal jurisdiction (UJ) holds that a 
nation can prosecute certain serious international offenses even though it 
has no connection to the conduct or participants.3 It has increasingly been 
used by European national courts and international tribunals to prosecute 
                                                 
1 See Garrison Courtney, Drug Enforcement Agency Press Release, DEA, Coast Guard 
Make Record Seizure (March 21, 2007), available at 
<http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/newsrel/wdo032107.html>; Remarks by Homeland 
Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Thad Allen 
and Drug Enforcement Administration Administrator Karen Tandy at a Press Conference 
Announcing the Coast Guard’s Record Maritime Cocaine Seizure (March 21, 2007), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1174566428378.shtm. 
2 Specifically, 20 miles off the coast of Panama, in the Panamanian “contiguous zone,” 
which runs 12-24 miles from the coast. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea Art. 33 (giving states some  police powers over their contiguous zones). 
3 See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 371 (E.D. La. 1997) 
(“Where a state has universal jurisdiction, it may punish conduct although the state has no 
links of territoriality or nationality with the offender or victim.” (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 cmt. a (1987)). See generally, Eugene 
Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, 
45 HARV. INT’L L. REV. 190-91 (2004) (discussing origins and basis for UJ) [hereinafter, 
Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy]. 
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alleged human rights violations around the world. The U.S., however, has 
been hostile to universal criminal jurisdiction as an international legal 
development. Even the U.S. statute criminalizing genocide, the 
paradigmatic modern UJ crime, only applies to crimes that directly involve 
the U.S.4 
However, under a little-known statute, America uses universal 
jurisdiction far more than any other nation, and perhaps even more than all 
other nations combined. For two decades, the United States has been 
punishing drug crimes (including possession) committed entirely by 
foreigners outside U.S. territory, with no demonstrable connection to the 
U.S. Under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA),5 the U.S. 
Coast Guard apprehends vessels with drugs on the high seas, often 
thousands of miles from American waters; the crews of these vessels are 
prosecuted in U.S. courts for violating U.S. drug law, and are sentenced to 
terms in U.S. jails. In none of these cases is there any evidence the drugs 
were destined for the U.S. While European UJ prosecutions in war crimes 
and genocide cases attract a great deal of attention as they involve major 
wars and high government officials, the MDLEA cases have gone almost 
unnoticed -- no doubt because the defendants are various low-level 
members of the Latin American drug trade.  
The MDLEA’s UJ provisions raise fundamental questions about the 
source and extent of Congress’s constitutional power to regulate purely 
foreign conduct. Courts have said the MDLEA fits under Congress’s power 
to “Define and Punish Piracies and Felonies on the High Seas.”6 Yet this 
only raises the question of whether that provision has any limits. Perhaps no 
Article I powers of Congress have received less attention than “Piracies and 
Felonies.”7 This Article is the second in a two-part project examining the 
limits of Congress’s power under the Define and Punish Clause and related 
issues – the first academic work examining the nature and scope of these 
powers. 8 That companion Article shows that Clause 10 authorizes UJ over 
                                                 
4 18 U.S.C. § 1091(d) (requiring offense to be committed by U.S. national or in U.S. 
territory). 
5 46 U.S.C Appendix § 1903(a) (1994); id. at § 1903(c)(1)(A) and (C). 
6 U.S. CONST., ART. I § 8, cl. 10. 
7 See United States v. Biermann, 678 F. Supp 437, 1445 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (“The courts 
of the United States have not had many occasions to interpret this constitutional 
provision.”); Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. Chi. Legal 
F. 323, 337 (2001) “[T]he scope of the Define and Punish Clause is unclear.”) [hereinafter, 
Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction]; THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 126, 
EDWARD MEESE, ET. AL, EDS.(2007) (describing the Clause’s meaning as “not 
controversial”). 
8 See Eugene Kontorovich, The “Define and Punish” Clause and Universal 
Jurisdiction: Recovering the Lost Limits, 103 NORTHWESTERN L. REV. __ (forthcoming, 
2009) (MS on file with author) [hereinafter, Kontorovich, Define and Punish]. 
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– at most – crimes that international law has established as universally 
cognizable. This limit applies both to the “Felonies” power and the 
“offenses against the law of nations.”  
Thus the “Define and Punish” clause does not generally authorize 
Congress to regulate foreign conduct with no demonstrable U.S. 
connection.9 Congress cannot punish dog-fighting by Indonesians in Java 
because Congress has not been authorized by the Constitution to make such 
laws. While some UJ may be permissible, it is only in narrowly defined 
circumstances. This Article contends that the most or all of the MDLEA’s 
jurisdictional provisions go beyond Congress’s Art. I powers in several 
ways.  
The point can be seen most clearly by looking at “Piracies and Felonies” 
in isolation from the Offenses power. The former consists of two distinct 
powers – one over piracies, the other over felonies. The powers are 
mentioned separately because they are in practice different. Piracy was at 
the time of the Framing, and has been until recently the only UJ crime. UJ 
was synonymous with the jurisdiction that applied to pirates. Indeed, UJ 
was the only characteristic that fundamentally distinguished piracy from 
other high seas “felonies.”  
Piracy’s unique status as a UJ offense suggests that its enumeration as a 
separate power specifically allows Congress to exercise UJ only over piracy 
– but not over other high seas “felonies” or international law offenses. To 
allow non-UJ crimes to be punished on a UJ basis would be to erase the 
distinction that was made in the Constitution between “Piracies” and 
“Felonies.” The same point applies to “Offenses against the law of nations,” 
of which piracy was also one. This understanding, while only suggested by 
the text, is confirmed by examining the view of those Founders who 
expressed a view on the matter, as well as the leading jurists of the early 
Republic. It is reflected in Supreme Court decisions, as well as Congress’s 
interpretation of its own powers. These lessons have apparently been 
forgotten, and the MDLEA cases barely mention the Piracies and Felonies 
clause. 
In short, the MDLEA can only be a valid exercise of the Felonies power 
if the drug offenses are UJ offenses in international law – which they are 
not. The Piracies and Felonies power also has other limits: it only applies on 
the high seas. Yet as this Article shows, many applications of the MDLEA 
extend beyond the high seas, suggesting they are invalid for an additional 
reason.  
 
The issue is of significant practical and theoretical importance. From a 
                                                 
9 See id. 
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criminal law perspective, hundreds if not thousands are in jail under this 
statute, which lies at best at the horizon of Congress’s Art. I powers. 
Furthermore, exploring the potential Art. I basis for the MDLEA exposes 
several important and novel questions of constitutional and international 
law in addition to the issue of UJ under Clause 10 explored in the 
companion Article. Can the foreign commerce clause be used to regulate 
conduct with no U.S. nexus? Can a law be considered an exercise of 
Congress’s treaty power if passed a decade before the relevant treaty is 
ratified. That is, can a treaty retroactively validate a statute? Do Senate 
declarations made when ratifying count as part of the treaty for the purpose 
of Congress’s lawmaking powers? Can Congress “define” a crime as an 
offense against international law when international law does not seem to 
treat it as such? To what extent can Congress assert UJ over acts committed 
not just in international waters but in foreign territory? Thus the MDLEA 
offers a tour of Art. I’s foreign relations provisions.  
 
Part I explains the history and purposes of the MDLEA, and outlines the 
provisions that apply without any nexus to the U.S. Part II explains that the 
Felonies power does not authorize UJ over offenses that international law 
does not treat as universally cognizable. It goes on to discuss how much 
discretion Congress has in “defining” whether an offense is universally 
cognizable when international law is unclear on the matter. Part III then 
applies this to drug smuggling, and finds no support in international custom 
for treating it as a UJ crime. Thus Congress cannot treat it as a “piracy.” It 
can only punish it if it has a U.S. nexus. Part III goes on to consider ways in 
which international jurisdictional rules might lend support to some aspects 
of the MDLEA. It also explains that some applications of the statute will be 
unconstitutional for an additional reason: they do not happen on the “high 
seas.” On the theory that Congress need not accurately identify the source 
of its constitutional power when enacting a statute, Part IV looks to other 
potential legislative powers that might provide a constitutional basis for the 
MDLEA. The Article concludes that there does not seem to be a clear Art. I 
source for much of the MDLEA’s provisions that apply U.S. law in the 
absence of a U.S. nexus. Other applications would depend on difficult 
interpretations of novel issues that would at least require more careful 
analysis and explicit discussion than the cursory treatment courts have thus 
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A.  Expanding Jurisdiction on the High Seas 
 
The increasing flow of drugs from the Southern Hemisphere into the 
U.S. – first marijuana in the 70s and then the more profitable cocaine in the 
80s – and the increasing sophistication of the smugglers lead Congress to 
gradually expand the scope of its extraterritorial law-making. Because of 
the difficulty of catching traffickers in the relatively short time they are in 
U.S. waters, the U.S. began projecting its enforcement increasingly far from 
its shores. Today the Coast Guard patrols the oceans thousands of miles 
away – and often just off the coast of other states – as part of U.S. anti-drug 
efforts. And to ensure the Coast Guard’s ability to catch those with drugs 
bound for the U.S., the Congress cast a net that pulls in – and makes subject 
to U.S. law – even those foreign vessels whose cargo is not demonstrably 
destined here. 
 
1. Marijuana on the High Seas Act 
 
The MDLEA built on and expanded the jurisdictional provisions of its 
predecessor, the Marijuana on the High Seas Act (MHSA), passed in 1980.  
Drug importation had significantly increased in the 1970s, and Coast Guard 
interdiction efforts became an important part of the War on Drugs. 
Smugglers adopted a “mothership” strategy, where a large drug-laden ship 
would hover on the high seas, just outside of U.S. customs waters, and bring 
the contraband to shore via many small and difficult to detect boats. When 
the motherships were seized on the high seas, successful prosecution proved 
elusive. The motherships themselves were generally foreign-flagged and 
foreign-crewed, and proving a conspiracy to import was apparently 
difficult.10 The House Report on the bill complained that the impunity of 
the foreign drug traffickers hurt Coast Guard morale.  
The main relevant innovation of the MHSA was to extend U.S. 
jurisdiction on the high seas not just to “U.S. vessels,” but also to a new 
category, “vessels subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” This 
latter category was defined as stateless vessels, meaning a vessel flying no 
flag, or bearing fraudulent or multiple registries.11 Earlier drafts of the 
legislation sought to extend jurisdiction to genuinely foreign vessels 
whenever the flag state consents. However, the Committee reported 
“various jurisdictional and constitutional” objections to using a state’s 
“prior consent as a basis for. . . domestic criminal jurisdiction.”12 The 
                                                 
10 See H.R. Rep. 96-323 at 5 (July, 10, 1979). 
11 Id. at 24-25. 
12 Report of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on H.R. 2538, at 7, Rep. 
No. 96-323  (July 10, 1979).  
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constitutional concerns were not made explicit, and the chief worry seemed 
to be about international law, which was understood to require a nexus for 
prosecution. The statute’s authors seemed to think that as a matter of 
international law, flag state consent would still be an inadequate basis given 
that drug trafficking “is not generally accepted as an international crime.”13 
However, under the MHSA, a “purported flag state” could reject a vessel’s 
claim of nationality.14 Thus the Marijuana on the High Seas Act did sweep 
in cases involving foreigners on the high seas, on non-American vessels, 
without proof that the vessel or cargo was destined for America. Moreover, 
the alleged flag state’s ability to deny claims of registry at its discretion 
could function as an informal version of consent jurisdiction.  
 
2. Adopting the MDLEA 
The MHSA proved anachronistic almost as soon as it was adopted. The 
cocaine boom of the 1980s lead to a vast increase in drug smuggling, and a 
correlate demand for more aggressive action. The 1980 statute, designed for 
a marijuana era, now seemed weak. Thus in 1986, Congress expanded the 
jurisdictional provisions of its maritime drug laws once again.  
The Senate report claimed the MHSA was troublesome to enforce. 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign vessels turned on defects in 
registry. However, evidence of a vessel’s nationality took several days to 
obtain from the defendant’s home state. It could be hard to prove whether a 
vessel was stateless. Obtaining such evidence that would be “sufficient to 
withstand evidentiary objections in a U.S. courtroom can take months.”15  
The MDLEA sought to avoid such problems by expanding jurisdiction far 
beyond stateless vessels. 
First, jurisdiction was extended to any vessel with some U.S. 
connection. This includes anyone aboard vessels registered in the U.S, 
owned or formerly owned, in whole or part by U.S. nationals or 
corporations;16 or U.S. nationals and resident aliens aboard any vessels; as 
well as any vessel in U.S. territorial or customs waters.17 But the statute 
also applies U.S. drug laws (not just importation laws) to vessels that fall 
outside this broad description, and even to foreign-crewed vessels in foreign 
waters. The MDLEA expanded on the MHSA by extending U.S. 
jurisdiction to any foreign vessels on the high seas, or even in foreign 
territorial waters, so long as the relevant f 18oreign nation consents.  
                                                 
13 Id. at 20.  
14 Committee Report at 23, analysis A.2(b). 
15 Sen. Rep. 99-530 at 15 (Oct. 6, 1986). 
16 §1803(b)(2)-(3). 
17 § 1903(a). 
18 § 1903(c)(1)(C). 
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This consent is broadly defined – it may be “oral” – and not subject to 
challenge in court: it “may be obtained by radio, telephone, or similar oral 
or electronic means.”19 Moreover, the definition of stateless vessels is 
expanded to those that do not produce evidence of their registry when 
requested by the Coast Guard20 – a request which, on the high seas or in 
foreign territorial waters, they may feel fully entitled to reject, as well as 
those whose registry is not “affirmatively and unequivocally” confirmed by 
the foreign state.21 Given that the Senate report makes clear that obtaining 
any kind of registry confirmation from foreign states is slow, difficult, and 
confusing, this provision would sweep in many genuinely foreign (not 
actually lacking a legitimate registry) vessels. 
Because these are classified as “vessels subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States,” no conspiracy to import need be proven; they are treated 
exactly as if they were U.S. ships, over which Congress’s power is plenary. 
Thus the statute clearly criminalizes mere “possession” on these foreign 
vessels in foreign or international waters.22 Moreover, the statute clearly 
instructed courts to construe these provisions as broadly as possible. It 
explicitly brushes aside any presumptions against extraterritoriality,23 and 
bars any jurisdictional or substantive defenses based on the U.S.’s “failure 
to comply with international law.”24 Indeed, a 1996 amendment sought to 
keep all questions of statelessness away from a jury by providing that 
“jurisdiction of the United States with respect to vessels subject to this 
chapter is not an element of any offense… [and] are preliminary questions 
of law to be determined solely by the trial judge.”25 With the cocaine 
epidemic raging, the “constitutional objections” that had dissuaded 
Congress from adopting a state-consent criterion of jurisdiction for the 
MHSA were absent from the discussion of the MDLEA. 
Congress did not specify which head of Art. I authority it exercised 
when enacting the MDLEA or its predecessor. However, courts and 
commentators have consistently seen the law as pursuant to the Piracies and 
Felonies Clause because “that clause is the only specific grant of power to 
be found in the Constitution for the punishment of offenses outside the 
territorial limits of the United States.”26 A few courts have implied that the 
                                                 
19 Id. at (c)(2)(C). 
20 Id. at (c)(2)(B). 
21 Id. at (c)(2)(C). 
22 § 1903(a). 
23 § 1903(h). 
24  § 1903(d). 
25 Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 104-324, § 1138(a)(5) 
26 United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 375 (5th Cir. 2002). See also, United States v. 
Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Burke, 540 F. Supp. 1282, 1288 
(D. P.R. 1982). 
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act must be an exercise of the felonies power in particular, though most 
have mistakenly spoke of “Piracies and Felonies” as if they are synonymous 
or interchangeable.27 Since this clause speaks directly to criminal legislation 
for the high seas, it seems to be the natural place to seek authority for the 
MDLEA.  
 
B.  Enforcement 
 
Under standard rules of international law, the Coast Guard cannot stop 
or board foreign vessels on the high seas or in foreign waters. Thus the 
United States has negotiated “bilateral maritime agreements” with 26 
Caribbean and Latin American states since the enactment of the MDLEA.28 
The agreements have been negotiated country by country over the past 20 
years. They set out frameworks for the U.S. to stop, search, and sometimes 
board the other state’s vessels if they are suspected of drug trafficking.29 
The agreements coordinate numerous technical and tactical aspects of joint 
counter-narcotics enforcement, including the “ship rider” program, where a 
law enforcement officer from one country embarks on the other’s vessels, 
with the authority to board and make arrests in the name of his home 
state.30 The agreements generally follow a standard six-part form apparently 
drafted by U.S. officials. However, the particular arrangement with each 
country often varies somewhat from the basic template, depending on 
particular local c 31oncern.  
                                                
 The agreements primarily provide a framework for the U.S. to interdict 
 
27 See, e.g., United States v. Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d 819, 824-25 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that drug smuggling in international waters is a “piracy or felony within the 
meaning of Article I, Section 8, Clause 10” without specifying whether it is justified by the 
power over “piracies” or over “felonies”); United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 
1052, 1056 (3rd Cir. 1993) (noting that MDLEA justified by Congress’s authority under 
“Piracies and Felonies” clause without specifying whether drug smuggling is piracy or 
felony).   
28 See United States Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (March 2007), 
available at <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2007/vol1/html/80853.htm>. Only a few 
nations in the area, such as Ecuador and Cuba, have not signed such an agreement.  
29 See, e.g. United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1168 (9th Cir. 2006) (seizure with 
Columbian consent pursuant to bilateral agreement). See also, Marian Nash Leich, U.S. -
U.K. Agreement on Vessels Trafficking in Drugs, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 377 (1982) . 
30 Agreement Concerning Cooperation for the Suppression of Illicit Maritime 
Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, with Implementing 
Agreement (United States-Honduras), Art IV. State Dept. No. 02-4 (March 29, 2000). 
31 See Statement of Rear Admiral Ernest R. Riutta Before the Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources Committee on Government Reform 
U. S. House Of Representatives (May 13, 1999), available at 
<http://testimony.ost.dot.gov/test/pasttest/99test/Riutta2.htm>. 
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and potentially seize foreign vessels, in coordination and with the approval 
of the flag state. They do not address prosecution of the crew in any detail. 
However, the typical agreement contains a clause that, while reserving 
primary jurisdiction over the vessel and crew to the flag state, notes it could 
waive it in favor of the U.S.32 Presumably the flag nation could authorize 
U.S. prosecution in the absence of an agreement saying that they might do 
so. If these clauses have any meaning, it is to make clear that no automatic 
or ex ante authorization to prosecute should be inferred from the boarding 
and seizure provisions of the agreements, which in many ways give the 
Coast Guard considerable authority over the other nation’s vessels. Some of 
the agreements make this point explicitly.33 
The MDLEA has quietly become the largest font of universal 
jurisdiction in U.S. courts, dwarfing the more high-profile Alien Tort 
Statute litigation. Indeed, the MDLEA appears to be the only statute under 
which the U.S. asserts universal criminal jurisdiction. The practical 
consequences are significant. Prosecutions under the MDLEA often involve 
a vessel’s entire crew.34 Given the large quantities of drugs on these vessels, 
these foreigners, captured on foreign vessels in international waters, can 
face decades in federal prison. And this despite potentially never having set 
foot in, or directed their activities towards, the U.S. The exact number of UJ 
prosecutions under the MDLEA is unclear, because the statute covers both 
U.S. vessels and nationals and foreign vessels and nationals, and applies in 
U.S. waters as well as the high seas. Separate statistics are not kept on how 
                                                 
32 See id., Art. VII(1):  
In all cases arising in the territorial sea or internal waters of the Republic of 
Honduras, or concerning Honduran flag vessels seaward of any State's territorial 
sea, the State of Honduras shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction 
over a detained vessel, cargo and/or persons on board (including seizure, 
forfeiture, arrest, and prosecution), provided, however, that the State of Honduras 
may . . . waive its primary right to exercise jurisdiction and authorize the 
enforcement of United States law against the vessel, cargo and/or persons on 
board. 
33 See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of Jamaica and the Government of 
the United States of America Concerning Cooperation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime Drug 
Trafficking Art. 3(5) (1997) (“Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as a waiver by 
a Party of its right to exercise jurisdiction over its nationals.”), available at 
<http://www.caricom.org/jsp/secretariat/legal_instruments/agreement_jamaica_us_drugtraf
fic.jsp?menu=secretariat>; Agreement Between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of Barbados Concerning Cooperation in Suppressing Illicit 
Maritime Drug Trafficking Art. 15(2) (1997) (“Nothing [in the agreement] shall be 
construed as authority for one Party to enforce its laws against nationals of the other 
Party.”). 
34 United States v. Humphries-Brant, 190 Fed. Appx. 837, 839-40 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(affirming denial of minor-participant sentence reduction to the 135 month sentence of 
simple crew member). 
23-Mar-08] Kontorovich 11 
many MDLEA prosecutions involve situations where there is no nexus with 
the U.S. A conservative guess would be 100 or more individuals a year. In 
one recent year, 199 people were arrested in Columbian vessels or waters 
alone.35 District court cases in the Westlaw databases show roughly 20 
decisions annually in recent years, though each case usually involves 
multiple defendants. Of course, there are many more UJ prosecutions, since 
the defendants, like in other criminal cases, almost invariably plead guilty 
and waive appeals. 
 
C.  MDLEA in the Courts 
 
The MDLEA has been subject to a wide variety of legal challenges – 
not surprisingly given the serious penalties under it. These have been almost 
invariably, and firmly, rebuffed by the courts.36 However, no published 
opinion deals squarely with the question of Congress’s Art I. power over 
purely foreign “Felonies.” 
 
1. Due Process issues 
 
Constitutional challenges to the MDLEA have focused on Due Process 
grounds.37 Defendants argue that the Fifth Amendment requires that 
defendants have some “nexus” or factual connection with the forum. If 
correct, this would rule out UJ. But the argument is framed in terms of 
individual rights rather than of the Article I limits on Congress.38 Most 
courts of appeals (including the 11th Circuit, which gets most MDLEA 
cases)39 have held that the Fifth Amendment requires no nexus. The Ninth 
Circuit, on the other hand, holds that due process requires that the 
defendant’s conduct have some nexus with U.S.40 
Due process is a personal right and thus can be waived – this points up 
an important difference in whether a nexus requirement is located in the 
                                                 
35 Statement of Adm. Ralph D. Utley Before the 109th Congress United States House 
of Representatives Committee on International Relations (May 11, 2005), available at 
<http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/109/utl051105.pdf>. Not all of these 
arrests necessarily lead to prosecution. 
36 The statute itself takes the U.S.’s “failure to comply with international law” off the 
table as a defense. See § 1903(d). 
37 See, e.g., United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1109 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
provisions of MDLEA requiring Court to decide whether statutory jurisdictional 
requirements have been met does not violate Apprendi, Due Process Clause or jury trial 
right).  
38 See Tinoco, at 1110 n. 21 (noting that case does not bear on Congress’s “substantive 
authority under Article I”). 
39 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 76 F.3d 931, 938, 940-41 (11th Cir. 1985). 
40 Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1161.  
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Fifth Amendment, or in Art. I limits on Congress’s legislative power. Most 
courts of appeals hold that whatever right the defendant has to not be 
subject to UJ is really an international law right of his state. In other words, 
it is not that the defendant has a right to be free of UJ, but rather that his 
state has the sovereign power to deal with his crime. In this view, even if 
there was a nexus requirement from the Due Process clause, the consent of 
the defendant’s home state to prosecution waives this defense.41 And such 
consent is routinely given in MDLEA cases,42 making the Fifth 
Amendment nexus defense a non-starter except in the Ninth Circuit.  
                                                
 
2. Article I issues 
The question of whether the MDLEA exceeds Congress’s Art. I limits 
has not been fully resolved by any court.43 However, in the past few years 
some defendants have begun to point to a pair of early 19th-century 
Supreme Court cases involving piracy and murder on the high seas 
indicating limits on UJ under the Felonies power.44 These arguments have 
usually been raised in a cursory manner for the first time on appeal or 
otherwise waived, and thus faced an uphill battle under a plain error 
standard. The 11th Circuit has denied such appeals with almost no 
discussion, noting that other courts had found the MDLEA to be an exercise 
of the Piracies and Felonies power, though those cases simply cited the 
clause, and did not discuss the issue of its limits,45 or that since the old 
 
41 See United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir 1999); United States v. 
Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir 1993). But see, United States v. 
Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1255-57 (9th Cir. 1998) (requiring for Fifth 
Amendment purposes evidence that drugs were bound for the U.S., even when home 
country consented to prosecution). 
42 United States v. Rodriquez-Duran, 507 U.S. F.3d, 749, 757 n.9 (1st. Cir. 2007) 
(describing the processes for obtaining foreign state consent, which usually takes about 10 
hours). 
43 Madera-Lopez, 190 Fed. Appx. at 835 (“There is no precedent from either the 
Supreme Court or this Court resolving the issue of whether the MDLEA’s enactment 
exceeded Congress’s authority under the “Piracies and Felonies Clause.”). 
44 The author of this article was responsible for drafting the first of these defense 
motions. See Unites States v. Garcia, 182 Fed. Appx. 873 (11th Cir. 2006). Though 
unsuccessful below and on appeal, the argument was quickly echoed by many other 
defendants. The view of the clause’s limits taken here and in Define and Punish Clause is 
the product of much more extensive research, and is in some ways different from those 
positions advanced in litigation. 
45 Compare United States v. Garcia, 182 Fed. Appx. 873, 876 (11th Cir. 2006) (“While 
there is little case law interpreting the scope of the High Seas Clause, other circuits have 
upheld the constitutionality of the MDLEA . . .[w]ithout specifically discussing the High 
Seas Clause’s limits.”) (citations omitted); with Madera-Lopez, 190 Fed. Appx. at 836 n.1 
(recognizing that cases cited in Garcia “did not discuss the limits of Congress’s authority 
under the Piracies and Felonies Clause”). 
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Supreme Court cases do not deal squarely with the statute at hand, they are 
not binding. 
To the extent courts have considered such arguments, they misread 
Palmer and Furlong as purely statutory cases about the scope of 1790 
Crimes Act,46 or based on international rather than constitutional law 
principles.47 Furthermore, litigants only began to mention the Piracies and 
Felonies clause after most courts had ruled that the Fifth Amendment does 
not require a nexus in MDLEA cases. Thus courts see the Felonies 
argument as simply a repleading of the oft-rejected nexus argument, and 
treat it is as a matter of stare decisis.48 This conflates two totally different 
inquiries – the Fifth Amendment and the Define and Punish clause. One 
provision can do what the other does not.49 The fact that the Fifth 
Amendment does require a nexus says nothing about whether Congress has 
the power to legislate absent a nexus. Indeed, this kind of logic succumbs to 
what the Framers saw as the greatest danger in having a Bill of Rights: 
people might conclude that if something is not prohibited by the first eight 
amendments, it is permitted – without examining whether Congress’s 
enumerated powers include such an act.  
As the next Part will show, there is good reason to believe that much of 
the MDLEA’s UJ application exceeds Congress’s Art. I limits. This was 
indeed recognized by the Marshall Court in Palmer and Furlong, as a close 
reading of those cases suggests. It is also corroborated by a wide range of 
other evidence not yet considered by any court an MDLEA case: strong 
statements made by Justices James Wilson and Joseph Story in their grand 
jury instructions, John Marshall’s famous House of Representatives speech 
                                                                                                                            
Even less persuasively, Suerte took the astonishing step of refusing to follow Furlong 
based on a notion that it “may be at loggerheads, however, with more recent 
pronouncements by the Court.” Of the two “pronouncements” relied on by Suerte, one is a 
dissent, and the other a dictum that does not deal with the Define and Punish Clause at all. 
46 United States v. Madera-Lopez, 190 Fed. Appx. 832, 836 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that because Furlong did not specifically “hold that Congress exceeded its authority under 
the Pirates and Felonies Clause by seeking to regulate drug trafficking on the high seas,” on 
plain error review of objection not raised below, district court did not err by finding 
MDLEA unconstitutional). 
47 See United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2002). 
48 United States v. Estupinan, 453 F.3d 1336, 1338 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that 
district court did not err in failing to strike down MDLEA sua sponte as exceeding 
Congress’s Define and Punish power because the circuit has not previously “adorned the 
MDLEA with a nexus requirement);  United States v. Garcia, 182 Fed. Appx. 873, 876 
(11th Cir. 2006) (“We have previously rejected the argument that the MDLEA is 
unconstitutional because the conduct at issue lacks a nexus to the United States.”) (citing 
Fifth Amendment cases). 
49 See Suerte, 291 F.3d at 374-75 (“The opinions addressing the reach of the 1790 Act 
are of significance to our consideration of the MDLEA’s reach [under the Fifth 
Amendment]”). 
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in the Thomas Nash affair, and the views of Congress in not extending UJ 
to the slave trade. Nor have courts considered the lessons that might be 
learned from the drafting history and purposes of the clause.  
Indeed, judicial discussions of the Piracy and Felonies power treat these 
“parallel provisions within the same constitutional clause” as having the 
same scope.50 This renders “piracy” entirely redundant: all piracies are 
felonies. As the next Part will show, “piracy” was different from all other 
felonies in one crucial way: it was universally cognizable. The separate 
enumeration of piracy suggests that its unique jurisdictional trait applies 
only to it, and not to other felonies on the high seas. 
 
II. “PIRACIES AND FELONIES” AND THE LIMITS ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
 
Congress has only those powers given to it. The question raised by the 
MDLEA is whether the Define and Punish Clause, and in particular its 
provision for “Piracies and Felonies on the High Seas,” is an open-ended 
empowerment for Congress to punish any crimes on the high seas and any 
offenses against the law of nations regardless of whether they have a 
connection with the United States. In the companion article, The “Define and 
Punish” Clause and Universal Jurisdiction: Recovering the Lost Limits, it is 
shown that while “piracies” can be punished without regard to nexus, “Felonies” 
and “Offenses” require a direct connection to the U.S.51 Thus while assaults on 
ambassadors were paradigmatic violations of the law of nations, an attack on the 
Fijian ambassador to Vanuatu by a citizen of the latter would not fall within 
Congress’s power over “offenses.” Similarly, while rape is a felony, when 
committed among Vanuatuans on one of their national vessels, it would not 
fall within Congress’s “Felonies” power.  
 The companion Article shows the limits of Clause 10 through a 
comprehensive examination of the clause’s origins, text, ratification, and 
purposes. It goes on to confirm this understanding of the clause against the 
views taken by the courts, the executive branch, and Congress during the 
Founding and early Republic – the last time the jurisdictional scope of the 
clause was an issue. Naturally, the full analysis cannot be repeated here. 
Rather, this Part summarizes the main lines of evidence for treating the 
grant of power over “Piracies” as jurisdictionally broader, but substantively 
narrower, than the power over felonies and offenses.52 Even if this 
                                                 
50 See Suerte, 291 F.3d at 374 (observing in MDLEA case that since piracy can be 
punished with no U.S. nexus, this “should apply with equal weight to felonies such as at 
issue here”). 
51 See generally, Kontorovich, Define and Punish, supra n.8. 
52 The companion Article explores these sources in greater detail, as well as 
considering potential objections, methodological questions, and the few pieces of 
inconsistent evidence. See id. 
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understanding does not persuade as an original matter, its adoption by these 
figures in a series of cases should, as a practical matter, make it hard for a 
court today to come to its own conclusions about the meaning of such an 
obscure and poorly-documented provision.  
A final point bears stressing. The argument here is not that Congress 
cannot violate international law, because it is directly binding on Congress. 
Such a view has long been rejected. Rather, it is that Clause 10, by using 
various terms of art from customary international law, requires one to turn 
to that body of law to define those terms. Thus international law is partially 
incorporated, but only by explicit reference. 
 
 
A.  The Drafting of the Clause and the legal background 
 
The Define and Punish Clause received little “serious” discussion at the 
Philadelphia Convention or during ratification.53 Yet on its face, the clause 
requires further analysis, as it contains a striking double redundancy. Piracy 
is a subspecies of felony on the high seas.54 Moreover, piracy is an offense 
against the law of nations.55 Constitutional construction disfavors readings 
that render certain provisions superfluous.56 Indeed, Justice Story insisted 
that other potentially overlapping words in Clause 10 should bear separate 
meanings.57 A double-redundancy begs the question whether anything 
distinguishes piracy both from other felonies and from other law of nations 
crimes. Such a difference would likely be the reason for the Constitution 
mentioning piracy separately.  
Indeed, one major difference existed between piracy and the other 
powers listed in Clause 10. Piracy was the only universal jurisdiction 
offense know to the Framers, indeed the only one until recent decades.58 
                                                 
53 JOSEPH STORY, III COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES  
§ 1160 (1833) (hereafter “STORY, COMMENTARIES”). 
54 See WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 107-
08 (2d ed. 1829) (“Felony. . . when committed on the high seas, amounts to piracy.”). 
55 See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, IV COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68, 71 
(observing that piracy is both a felony under English law and an offense against the law of 
nations) (1769); FEDERALIST NO. 42 (Madison). 
56 See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 392 (1821) (Marshall, C.J) (arguing 
against a suggested interpretation of Constitution that would render another provision 
“mere surplusage”).  
57 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158 (1820) (Story, J.). 
58 See Marshall in Robbins Case (emphasis added) (noting that “piracy under the law 
of nations which alone is punishable by all nations”); Smith, 18 U.S. at 162 (1820) (noting 
the “general practice of all nations in punishing all persons, whether natives or foreigners, 
who have committed this offence against any persons whatsoever”); Talbot v. Jansen, 3 
U.S. (Dall.) 133, 165-66 (1795) (“All piracies and trespasses committed against the general 
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The definition of piracy in international law was narrow, specific, and 
undisputed: robbery on the high seas. Piracy and its notorious UJ status 
(referred to at the time as hostis humani generis, enemy of all mankind), 
were congruent, almost synonymous. 
However, in addition to piracy under the law of nations, each nation 
could make diverse offenses “municipal” or “statutory piracies.” Such 
statutory piracy could only be punished within the particular state’s 
municipal jurisdiction.59 As Wheaton, the American diplomat, reporter of 
Supreme Court decisions, and author of the leading early 19th century 
American treatise on international law, put it: “piracy created by municipal 
statute could only be punished by that State within whose territorial 
jurisdiction” or “on board whose vessels the offence thus created was 
committed.”60 The distinction between “municipal” and “international” or 
true piracy obviously tracks the constitutional distinction between felonies 
and piracies. It suggests that Congress can “punish” piracy consistent with 
its UJ status, but that should not spill over to “felonies.”  
 
B.  Early interpretations 
 
With one exception, Congress did not use the Piracies and Felonies 
clause to legislate universally over anything but piracy itself until the 
MDLEA. The First Congress exercised the “Piracies and Felonies” power 
when it enacted the first criminal statute in 1790. It purported to criminalize 
“murder or robbery” when committed by “any person” on the high seas.61 
                                                                                                                            
law of nations, are enquirable, and maybe proceeded against, in any nation.”). See 
generally Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra n.3, at 190-91. 
59 HENRY WHEATON, ENQUIRY INTO VALIDITY OF THE BRITISH CLAIM TO A RIGHT OF 
VISITATION AND SEARCH OF AMERICAN VESSELS SUSPECTED TO BE ENGAGED IN THE 
ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE 16 (Philadelphia 1842) (hereinafter WHEATON, RIGHT OF VISIT) 
(“All that is meant is, that the offence is visited with the pains and penalties of piracy.”). 
60 Id. 
61 Section 8 of the statute provided that: 
if any person or persons shall commit upon the high seas, or in any river, 
haven, basin, or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, murder or 
robbery, or any other offence which if committed within the body of a county, 
would by the laws of the United States be punishable with death; or if any captain 
or mariner of any ship or other vessel, shall piratically and feloniously run away 
with such ship or vessel, or any goods or merchandise to the value of fifty dollars, 
or yield up such ship or vessel voluntarily to any pirate; or if any seaman shall lay 
violent hands upon his commander, thereby to hinder and prevent his fighting in 
defence of his ship or goods committed to his trust, or shall make a revolt in the 
ship; every such offender shall be deemed, taken, and adjudged to be a pirate and 
felon, and being thereof convicted shall suffer death: and the trial of crimes 
committed on the high seas, or in any place out of the jurisdiction of any particular 
state, shall be in the district where the offender is apprehended, or into which he 
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Subsequent sections went on to say “any person” shall be punished for a 
variety of maritime misdeeds, such as “running away with a vessel,” revolt, 
assaulting commanders, and attempts and conspiracies to do those things. 
Robbery on the high seas was, of course, the international law crime of 
piracy, or “general” piracy. But the other offenses that the statute dubbed 
“piracy” and made punishable when committed by “any person,” without 
restriction. A literal reading would extend U.S. legislative power 
universally to a wide variety of major and minor crimes aboard any vessel 
on the high seas, and even to some ancillary offenses on land. 
 The constitutionality of punishing “all persons” for anything other than 
international piracy was immediately called into doubt by Justice James 
Wilson, a member of the constitutional convention and subsequent state 
ratification process, as well as a justice on the first Supreme Court.62 
Instructing a grand jury, Wilson noted the well-known distinction between 
general piracy and other maritime crimes that a nation may penalize. This 
distinction exists regardless of whether the latter are dubbed “piracies” by 
statute. If Congress intended the murder provision to apply to foreigners on 
foreign vessels, it would be unconstitutional.63  
Similarly, John Marshall, while a congressman from Virginia, attacked 
the constitutionality of a statue during his famous speech on the House floor 
in the affair of Jonathan Robbins. First, he argued that the idea that 
Congress’s power to punish felonies on the high seas was unlimited lead to 
consequences too absurd to accept. Could the U.S. punish desertion by 
British seamen from a British to a French vessel, or pick-pocketing among 
British sailors? Such a general jurisdiction over high seas offenses had 
never been suggested, and certainly could never have been intended by the 
drafters or ratifiers. If the text does not expressly forbid it, Marshall argued, 
it is only because it was too silly for the Framers to have thought of.  
Moreover, even if Congress for some reason wanted to legislate for 
purely foreign causes, it could not: “Any general expression in a legislative 
act must, necessarily, be restrained to objects within the jurisdiction of the 
legislature passing the act.”64 Thus if the Crimes Act attempted to attach UJ 
to anything but piracy, it would go too far, regardless of any findings or 
statements by the legislature.  
 
 [T]hat [Define and Punish] clause can never be construed to make to 
the government a grant of power, which the people making it do not 
                                                                                                                            
may first be brought. (emphasis added). 
62 See James Wilson, Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of 
Virginia, in May 1791, in WORKS OF THE HON. JAMES WILSON, 354 (Philadelphia 1804). 
63 Id. at 377 (observing the universal application of the murder provisions “could not 
be carried out by the courts”). 
64 Id. at 863. 
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themselves possess. It has already been shown that the people of the 
United States have no jurisdiction over offences committed on board a 
foreign ship against a foreign nation. Of consequence, in framing a 
government for themselves, they cannot have passed this jurisdiction to 
that government. The law [the Crimes Act], therefore, cannot act upon 
the case. But this clause of the constitution cannot be considered, and 
need not be considered, as affecting acts which are piracy under the law 
of nations.65 
 
Thus both Marshall and Wilson doubted that Congress could 
constitutionally extended UJ to anything but piracy, which was the only 
offense universally cognizable under the law of nations.  
 
C.  Supreme Court Precedents 
 
The Supreme Court did not confront the question until nearly two 
decades later, in United States v. Palmer.66 The case was a classic 
international law piracy – the armed robbery of a Spanish vessel by a 
foreign defendant. The Court held that while Congress could 
constitutionally extend UJ to genuine “piracies,” the 1790 Act had not done 
so. This conclusion was surprising given the statute’s capacious language of 
“any person” – the same language used in the MDLEA.67 Moreover, it went 
against what was generally perceived as Congress’s goal in passing to 
statute – to punish piracy to the same extent all other nations do, namely, 
universally. (Indeed, Congress promptly passed a new statute to provide 
clear authorization for piracy UJ.) Marshall’s reasoning followed the exact 
same lines he had laid down twenty years earlier in Robbins’ case. The 
statute must be interpreted non-literally even in the case of piracy, because 
if “any person” were read literally, it would be quite problematic to apply to 
all the non-piratical offenses listed in the statute. Marshall’s clear flouting 
of Congressional intent was clearly a narrowing construction to save the 
statute from constitutional difficulty.  
Because of the narrowing construction, Marshall did not have to directly 
express the constitutional issue. But the arguments for reading the statute 
narrowly in Palmer were the same ones he used the House to explain why a 
broad reading would be unconstitutional. Moreover, both the U.S. Attorney, 
arguing for a broad scope for the law, conceded it could not constitutionally 
apply universally to non-piratical offenses, and Justice Johnson wrote 
separately to stress what was just below the surface in Marshall’s opinion.68   
                                                 
65 United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 832-33, No. 16,175 (D.C. S.C. 1799). 
66 16 (3 Wheat.) U.S. 610 (1818). 
67 46 App. U.S.C.  § 1903(a) 
68 Palmer, 16 U.S. at 641-42 (“Congress can inflict punishment on offences committed 
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Two years later a unanimous Court reaffirmed that Congress could not 
punish the murder of a foreigner by a foreigner on a foreign vessel.69 Such a 
case was one in which Congress “ha[s] no right to interfere.”70 This Court 
makes clear that that this limitation is not one found in international law, or 
due process, or the statute itself. Rather, it is found in the difference 
between “Piracy” and “Felony” in Clause 10. As the Court put it, UJ in such 
a case would go beyond the “the punishing powers of the body that 
enacted” the law.71 The Court went on to distinguish between piracies at 
international law, and other crimes. Murder, when it involves only 
foreigners abroad, is a matter in which Congress “has no right to interfere;” 
on the other hand, piracy under identical circumstances falls within the 
“acknowledged reach of the punishing powers of Congress.”  
The Court’s distinction between piracy and murder precisely tracks the 
“Piracies and Felonies” distinction: 
  
There exist well-known distinctions between the crimes of piracy and 
murder, both as to constituents and incidents. Robbery on the seas is 
considered as an offence within the criminal jurisdiction of all nations.  . 
. . Not so with the crime of murder. It is an offence too abhorrent to the 
feelings of man, to have made it necessary that it also should have been 
brought within this universal jurisdiction. And hence, punishing it when 
committed within the jurisdiction, or, (what is the same thing,) in the 
vessel of another nation, has not been acknowledged as a right.72  
 
The “constituents” of the crimes are their elements – the substantive 
conduct. The “incidents” are the rules regarding their punishment. Furlong 
makes two points: Congress does not have power to “define” the 
“constituents” of offenses without regard to the international law definition. 
And, more pertinently for present purposes, it cannot apply the “incidents” 
of piracy to something that does not have that status. Of course, the only 
“incident” of piracy that it did not share with murder was its UJ status.   
The test of what Congress can make universally cognizable is the law of 
nations; Congress cannot expand its jurisdiction by calling crimes “piracies” 
when they do not have such a status in international law. Piracy and murder 
“are things so essentially different in their nature, that not even the 
                                                                                                                            
on board the vessels of the United States, or by citizens of the United States, any where; 
but Congress cannot make that piracy which is not piracy by the law of nations, in order to 
give jurisdiction to its own courts over such offences.”) (emphasis added). 
69 See United States v. Furlong, 618 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820). 
70 Id. at 198. 
71 Id. at 196 (emphasis added). 
72 Id. at 198. 
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omnipotence of legislative power can confound or identify them.”73 It would 
be harder to find clearer language expressing the view that this limit is 
inherent and nonderogable.74 
 
D.  Congressional self-limitation. 
 
In the early 1800s, the U.S. and Europe began taking measures to ban 
the transatlantic slave trade. A growing number of nations banned the trade 
and a series of international congresses decried it as an abomination. In 
1820 Congress went further than any other nation had ever gone before by 
declaring the slave trade a form of “piracy” punishable by death.75 The 
statute applied to “any citizen of the United States, being of the crew or 
ship’s company of any foreign ship or vessel engaged in the slave trade, or 
any person whatever, being of the crew or ship’s company of any ship or 
vessel, owned in the whole or part, or navigated for, or in behalf of, any 
citizen or citizens of the United States.” In other words, Congress extended 
jurisdiction just short of UJ, but no further. While the Act cast the 
jurisdictional net broadly, and dubbed the trade piratical, Congress chose to 
only punish the conduct to the extent it had a demonstrable U.S. nexus.76 
The legislative history makes clear that Congress would have liked to 
punish the trade without any regard to U.S. nexus. Congress wanted to 
eliminate the trade itself, not just U.S. involvement, which had already been 
criminalized by earlier laws. But slave trading was at the time clearly not a 
violation of international law and not recognized as universally 
cognizable.77  
                                                 
73 Id. at 199. 
74 See See A. Mark Weisburd, Due Process Limits On Federal Extraterritorial 
Legislation?, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 379, 420 (1997). 
75 Statutes at Large, 16th Congress, Sess. I, Ch. 113, 1820, An Act to continue in force 
an act to protect the commerce of the United States, and punish the crime of piracy,” and 
also to make further provisions for punishing the crime of piracy, §§ 4-5. 
76 Many of the cases brought under the Act revolved around whether either the 
citizenship or ownership requirements were satisfied. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 25 
F.Cas. 1364, (Cir. Ct. N.Y. 1861). Before passports, when much of the U.S. population 
were first or second generation immigrants, determining a defendant’s nationality was not 
easy, especially if he wished to obscure it. Similarly, slave traders resorted to a variety of 
measures, like fictitious sales and renaming to throw off their American connection. As an 
element of the offense, the jurisdictional requirements had to be proven by the U.S., and 
thus defendants relied heavily on this point. 
77 The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825); III JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 381 (1824) (reporting 
resolution questing President to negotiate with other nations to establish slave trade as 
jurisdictionally equivalent to piracy); HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, § 124, 200-201 (1836).  
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The report on the bill from the House Committee on the Slave Trade 
makes clear that Congress limited the reach of the Act because of concerns 
about the limits of its Piracies and Felonies powers.78 In explaining why the 
law only punished offenses with an American connection, the House report 
explained that “the Constitutional power of the Government has already 
been exercised . . . in defining the crime of piracy” as far is it can go given 
that the slave trade had yet to become universally cognizable: 
 
Such is the unavoidable consequence of any exercise of the authority of 
Congress, to define and punish this crime. The definition and punishment 
can bind the United States alone. 79 
 
Thus in the act of 1820, the U.S. acted “only in relation to themselves,” 
understanding that “they were bound to execute it, by the injunction of their 
constitution to execute it, so far as respects the punishment of their own 
citizens.”80 Congress’s view of its power over non-UJ “Felonies” as 
jurisdictionally limited strongly corroborates the understanding suggested 
by the separate mention of piracies and felonies, and views expressed by the 
Framers, influential interpreters such as Marshall and Story, and in Supreme 
Court dicta. Indeed, as statement against interest – limiting its own power – 
Congress’s inaction in 1820 may carry additional interpretive weight. 
 
III. THE MDLEA EXCEEDS CLAUSE 10’S LIMITS 
 
Congress cannot attach the jurisdictional consequences of “piracies” to 
“felonies.” This raises the question of whether drug trafficking is a piracy or 
felony.” It takes little effort to show that it does not fit within the traditional 
definition of piracy as “robbery on the high seas,”81 or even the more 
modern definition of “acts of violence or detention, or any act of 
depredation, committed for private ends” aboard a vessel.82  
However, the Define and Punish clause’s limitation of UJ to piracy can 
be understood in one of two ways. The more textual or originalist 
understanding would be that only piracy is the only offense which Congress 
can punish without a U.S. nexus. A broader view would reason that since 
piracy was the only UJ offense at the time of the Founding, the Clause 
means to allow Congress to use UJ over whatever offenses are universally 
                                                 
78 See ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 16th Cong. 1st sess., 2209 (May 10?, 1820). 
79 See ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 16th Cong. 1st sess., 2209 (May 10?, 1820). 
80 See WHEATON, RIGHT OF VISITATION, supra n. 59, at 109-10 (emphasis added).  
81 See United States v. Smith. 
82 UNCLOS Art. 101(a). The violence or depredation must be “directed… against” 
people on the ship or on another ship on the high seas. Operating a pirate vessel or 
facilitating or encouraging piratical acts also counts as piracy. Id. at 101(b)-(c). 
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cognizable under the CIL of the time. Thus as new offenses become 
universally cognizable, the scope of “piracies” changes and expands. No 
position is taken here on the permissibility of “updating” to track evolving 
international law.  
If the Constitutional text locks into the 1789 limits on UJ, the MDLEA 
obviously exceeds this limit. If “updating” is allowed, the analysis is 
somewhat more complex. Thus for the sake of argument, this section 
assumes “piracies” encompasses today’s UJ offenses, and the Clause 10 as 
a whole tracks changes in international law. Nonetheless, this Part shows 
even with “updating,” the MDLEA exceeds the Define and Punish Clause’s 
limits in two distinct ways: it treats “Felonies” as “Piracies,” and punishes 
them even beyond the “high seas.”  
 
 
A.  Congressional discretion to “Define” 
 
Some might view the grant to Congress of a power to “define… piracies 
and … offenses” as giving it the final say on what is a non-UJ felony and 
what is not. Thus before considering whether modern CIL provides some 
basis for the MDLE, this section shows that Congress does not get the first 
and last word on the content of CIL.  
The “Define and Punish” clause raises questions about how much 
flexibility Congress has in “defining.”83 Can courts look to the law of 
nations to determine whether Congress has defined a crime that is actually 
recognized by international law, or is whether something violates the law of 
nations itself a question left entirely to Congress through its power to 
“define”? The word “define” may suggest some latitude for Congress, that 
                                                 
83 Zephyr Rain Teachout, Note, Defining and Punishing Abroad: Constitutional Limits 
on the Extraterritorial Reach of the Offenses Clause, 48 DUKE L.J. 1305, 1305 (1999). The 
few academic discussions arrive at markedly different answers. Beth Stephens, Federalism 
and Foreign Affairs: Congress’s Power to “Define and Punish… Offenses Against the Law 
of Nations,” 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 545 (2000) (“[I]n deciding what falls within the 
reach of the Clause, Congress’s decisions are entitled to significant deference from the 
judiciary.”); and, Note, The Offenses Clause After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 2378 (2005) (arguing that the “fluid, self-reinforcing character of modern customary 
international law and the role Congress has in shaping international law” requires that in a 
post-Erie world, Congress not be confined to defining offenses clearly or certainly 
established as violations of international law); with, Charles D. Siegal, Deference and Its 
Dangers: Congress’ Power To “Define . . . Offenses Against the Law of Nations”, 21 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 865, 879 (1988) (“It would . . . extend the clause too far to 
permit Congress to use it to define offenses without a clear international law basis.”), and 
Teachout, 1321 (arguing that purpose of provision was “to enable Congress to clarify 
unclear international law” rather than to “grant Congress the power to create its own 
version of international law.”). 
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it is not entirely bound by some external, objectively-determinable body of 
international law.  
The history of the provision suggests conflicting answers, and the courts 
have had few occasions to address the question. The clause, as it first 
appeared coming out of the Committee on Detail, gave Congress the power 
“to declare the law and punishment of piracies and felonies & c.”84 
Ultimately “define” was substituted for “declare the law of,” though with 
little apparent change in meaning.85 The spirit of the provision seems to be 
that felonies and the law of nations refer to a broad body of law, external to 
the Constitution, whose precise details, elements and penalties vary. 
Congress could statutorily provide the requisite specificity to allow for 
certain and uniform punishment.86  
The convention rejected Gouverneur Morris’s suggestion replacing the 
“define” with “designate” because the former term “would be limited to its 
preexisting meaning.”87 Other members of the Convention argued that 
“define” would allow the “creation of new offenses” in the case of felonies, 
but not piracies. This implies that Congress cannot “designate” something 
that the law of nations had not already made a piracy. Rather, Congress can 
only specify the elements of an offense whose rough outlines emerged from 
international custom. On the other hand, if the Framers were concerned that 
the law of nations in its raw form was “too vague and deficient to provide a 
rule” to govern individual behavior, it could be difficult for courts to 
determine whether a given “definition” fits within the “vague” parameters. 
This would be especially true under todays more fluid and expansive 
international law.88 Thus the scant evidence from the Framing does not 
seem to resolve the issue. 
Few decisions address the question directly.89 However, the Court has  
from the time of the early Republic acted as if it can review Congress’s 
                                                 
84 2 FARRAND, supra note , at 129 n.1 
85 Id. at 614-15. 
86 Madison, FEDERALIST PAPERS; United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1820) 
(Story, J.): 
Offences. . . against the law of nations, cannot. . . be said to be completely 
ascertained and defined in any public code recognised by the common consent of 
nations. In respect, therefore, as well to felonies on the high seas as to offences 
against the law of nations, there is a peculiar fitness in giving the power to define 
as well as to punish; and there is not the slightest reason to doubt that this 
consideration had very great weight in producing the phraseology in question. 
87 FARRAND at 316.  
88 See HARV. L. REV. 118 at 2392. 
89 Perhaps most recently, in Ex Parte Quirin, the Court considered whether the charged 
offenses against the laws of war were in fact violations of the law of war. 317 U.S. 1, 18-19 
(1942). 
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“definition” against the external standard of the law of nations.90 The Court 
in Furlong, much like Marshall in his 1799 House speech, strongly insisted 
that Congress cannot entirely arbitrarily classify something as a felony or 
piracy (i.e., universally cognizable). This must depend on its status in 
surrounding law: 
Nor is it any objection to this opinion, that the law [the 1790 Crimes Act] 
declares murder to be piracy. These are things so essentially different in their 
nature, that not even the omnipotence of legislative power can confound or 
identify them.  . . .  If by calling murder piracy, it might assert a jurisdiction 
over that offence committed by a foreigner in a foreign vessel, what offence 
might not be brought within their power by the same device?91 
 
  
Perhaps the most discussed case on the subject is United States v. 
Arjona, in which the Court upheld a law against counterfeiting foreign 
currency as an exercise of the Offenses power.92 The Court briefly 
considered whether the law legitimately falls within the “offenses” 
category. It did not entirely take Congress’ word for it at all, but rather 
looked to international law treatises. It found that the counterfeiting of 
currency itself by individuals was not a violation of international law; 
rather, international law imposed obligations on nations to prevent their 
citizens from counterfeiting.93 So the Court sustained the statute as  
“necessary and proper” for the U.S.’s compliance with international law. 
Some have suggested that Arjona’s “quick look” at international law, 
and its sustaining of the statute despite finding a nexus rather than a tight fit 
between it and international law, provides precedent for a very deferential 
view of the Offenses power. However, Arjona is simply not that much of an 
Offenses precedent at all. The Court saw the primary source of 
congressional power as the Foreign Commerce clause aided by the 
Necessary and Proper clause.94 And the Court’s casual discussion of 
international law constantly refers back to great effect such counterfeiting 
can have on U.S. economic relations.95  
The purposes and precedent provide no support for the view that 
Congress can “invent” offenses, or that courts cannot measure exercises of 
                                                 
90 See Smith, 18 U.S. at 160-61 (holding that statutory offense of “piracy as defined by 
the law of nations” is in fact a violation of clear international law and thus punishable). 
91 Furlong, at 198 (emphasis added). 
92 129 U.S. 479 (1887). 
93 Id. at 484-85 (“The national government is . . . made responsible to foreign nations 
for all violations by the United States of their international obligations.”). 
94 Id. at 483. 
95 Id. at 486-67. Indeed, Congress did not cast the statute as an exercise of the Offenses 
power; that argument apparently only arose in litigation. See id. at 488. 
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the Offenses clause against the law of nations as they understand it.96 The 
word “define” means an “express enumeration of all the particulars included 
in that term,” according to Justice Story.97 This suggests that Congress can 
fill in interstitial questions, or resolve particular disputes and uncertainties 
about the elements of an offense, but it cannot punish primary conduct that 
is not an international crime.  
Because the Clause refers to an external legal standard to limit 
Congress, it suggests a particularly strong role for judicial review.98 If the 
law of nations cannot be used to establish judicially-reviewable limits on 
Congress’s action, it could use the Offenses power to legislate regarding 
anything. The obscure Clause 10 would overshadow all other regulatory 
powers, even the Commerce Clause. It would be odd that such a vast grant 
of authority over individuals, unchecked by any limiting principle, would 
exist in the Constitution, or that it would have gone unnoted at the 
convention and ratification debates.99 Thus the most extensive examination 
of the question has found that courts have consistently looked for 
substantial state practice to establish the existence of a customary 
international law (CIL) norm.100 
At the same time, limiting Congress to a preexisting definition would 
nullify the power to “define,” a power which the Framers deliberately 
conferred. Thus some slack between Congress’s “offenses” and “the law of 
nations” must be tolerated. Yet the idea that Congress is owed substantial 
deference in determining whether something violates international law 
ultimately borders on a power to “invent.” This is especially true in an era 
when many loose claims are made on the basis of international law, and few 
                                                 
96 See Siegal, supra n.83, at 877. 
97 See United States v. Smith. Accord, 11 OP. ATT’N GEN. 297, 299 (1865) (“To define 
is to give the limits or precise meaning of a word or thing in being; to make is to call into 
being. Congress has power to define, not to make, the laws of nations . . ..”). 
98 See Siegal, supra n.83, at 940-42. 
99 See Teachout, supra n. 83, at 1321-22 (arguing that the “unambitious” purposes of 
provision were to allow Congress to reach violations of international law for which the 
U.S. would be held accountable, and to serve this goal, there would be no need for 
Congress to criminalize conduct the rest of the world did not see as violating the law of 
nations).  
100 See Siegal, supra n. 83, at 895 (“([F]for the first 100 years after the Constitution, in 
deciding the existence of customary international law, justices of the Supreme Court 
looked to the actual practice of states.”). There is, however, substantial doubt about how 
accurate such judicial investigations are, and the effort is likely to be even more difficult 
today, given the proliferation of relevant languages, sources, and nations whose practice 
counts towards the establishment of custom. See Michael Ramsey, International Law and 
the Denominator Problem; Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of 
International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999) (arguing that Supreme Court mistakenly 
took routine self-interested behavior for CIL norm in famous Paquette Habana case). 
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areas of human life lie outside the scope of some purported IL norm, and 
advocates argue for a CIL that can emerge without overt state practice. If 
the Courts do not police the “law of nations” requirement, Congress can by 
citing some General Assembly resolutions and law review articles give 
itself authority over anything. This would be inconsistent with the idea of 
limited and enumerated powers, and would tend to frustrate the purposes of 
judicial review. Thus while some slack must be allowed to exist between an 
“objective” judicial view of the law of nations and Congress’s “definition,”  
this says little about how much. Perhaps a useful distinguishing principle 
would be elements of an offense versus the general form of the offense. 
Obviously these can collapse into each other at a high enough level of 
abstraction, but line-drawing problems are the life of the law. 
 
B.  Drug Smuggling Not Universally Cognizable 
 
The two sources of international law are treaties and customary 
(unwritten) international law.101 The Constitution gives Congress different 
powers to implement each type of international law. Mainstream 
interpretations of the Treaty Power authorize Congress to implement 
treaties through domestic legislation even when the law would not 
otherwise fall within the enumerated powers.102 When a treaty is in the 
picture, the terms of the treaty itself govern the scope of Congress’s 
jurisdictional power.103 The “Offenses” power is implicated when there is 
no treaty basis for the law, and so one must look to see whether Congress’s 
offense roughly corresponds to customary international law. (Indeed, the 
“law of nations” is the 18th century term for CIL.)  
Drug trafficking is not recognized in customary international law as a 
universally cognizable offense. Indeed, it is not a crime at international law 
at all.104 While there is no firm agreement on the precise set of crimes 
                                                 
101 See Charter of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38. 
102 See Missouri v. Holland,  252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
103 See Part IV.A, infra. UJ laws were passed specifically to implement certain 
multilateral conventions. However, these statutes arguably go further than the treaties they 
are based on. The conventions only purport to confer jurisdictional over nationals of 
signatory states. While most countries have joined these treaties, the implementing statutes 
do not limit their application to nationals of signatory states. 
104 See SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412-418 (2006) 
(describing drug traffic as area of international criminal cooperation rather than 
international crime); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 436 (2d. ed. 2005) 
(observing that illicit traffic in narcotic drugs not a crime in customary international law); 
Many scholars suggest that the international crimes for which an individual may be held 
criminally responsible are congruent with those which fall under universal jurisdiction; 
certainly the major IL crimes are also universally cognizable, as the factors that contribute 
to the former status are the same that lead to the latter. Id. 
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subject to universal jurisdiction, there is a general consensus that they are 
egregious, violent human rights abuses. Not a single universal jurisdiction 
offense, or indeed widely recognized international crime, is a so-called 
victimless offense. All U.S. courts to consider the issue have held that 
narcotics traffic falls outside of universal jurisdiction.105 Thus the most 
respected lists of UJ offenses do not mention drugs at all.106 Moreover, 
commentators uniformly agree that there is absolutely no state practice 
whatsoever for the universality of drug crimes (aside from the MLDEA, of 
course).107 No international convention criminalizes drug crimes, and no 
international tribunal punishes them.  
The most comprehensive statement on the law of the sea is the 
comprehensive Third United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea 
(UNCLOS III). The United States has not ratified the treaty, but the U.S. 
(and almost all scholars) regard it as expressing the customary international 
law on the subject.108 UNCLOS expressly addresses drug smuggling and 
piracy in neighboring provisions.109  It makes clear the former is not an 
                                                 
105 See United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting UJ 
as jurisdictional basis for MDLEA); United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 168 n. 
5 (3rd Cir. 1986) (“[I]nternational agreements have yet to recognize drug smuggling as a 
threat to a nation’s ‘security as a state or the operation of its governmental functions,’ 
warranting protective jurisdiction, RESTATEMENT,  supra n.3, at § 33, or as a heinous crime 
subject to universal jurisdiction.”); United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, 
1344 n. 6 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (“Drug trafficking is not recognized as being subject to universal 
jurisdiction.”). But see, United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1382 n. 16 (11th 
Cir.1982) (finding “growing consensus” that drug trafficking should be UJ offenses and 
suggesting that “it may well be that the time has arrived” that Congress “should” pass UJ 
legislation to punish “all foreign vessels on the high seas that are engaged in drug 
trafficking”). Marino-Garcia’s brief dictum is particularly odd in that it suggests Congress 
can substantially punish anticipate IL developments, and act before an international 
consensus has emerged. Even the Eleventh Circuit has avoided repeating this view.  
106 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 5(1) (listing genocide, 
war crimes, aggression, crimes against humanity as crimes within jurisdiction of the court); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404; 
PRINCETON PRINCIPLES OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 29 (2001), available at 
<http://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/unive_jur.pdf>. 
107 See Adelheid Puttler, Extraterritorial Application of Criminal Law: Jurisdiction to 
Prosecute Drug Traffic Conducted By Aliens Abroad, in EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, KARL M. MEESSEN ED.103 (1996) (“Similar to slave trade [in 
the 19th century, when most nations condemned and banned it but refused to agree to UJ], 
existing state practice does not support the conclusion that illicit drug traffic is subject to 
universal jurisdiction as a matter of customary law.”). 
108 Statement of President Ronald Reagan on United States Ocean Policy, 22 I.L.M. 
461, 464 (1983) (“[T]he convention . . . contains provisions with respect to traditional uses 
of the oceans which generally confirm existing maritime law and practice.”) 
109 Compare United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 
December 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982), Arts. 100, 101, 
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international law crime like the latter is, and that drug smuggling is not 
regarded as being sufficiently heinous to warrant universal jurisdiction. 
Indeed, in the drafting of the convention, extending UJ to drug trafficking 
vessels was proposed and rejected.  
The common denominator of UJ offenses is their extraordinary 
heinousness. An offense must be regarded as so inhumane, so shocking to 
the conscience, that it makes all jurisdictional limitations moot.110 Indeed, 
the Second Circuit has recently held that terrorism has not attained the 
status of a universal jurisdiction offense, and thus U.S. courts cannot put it 
on the same jurisdictional footing as “Piracy.”111  
The Senate Report on the MDLEA described drug smuggling as 
“universally recognized criminal behavior.”112 Some courts have taken this 
as a determination that it is an international crimes. But this finding does no 
such thing. There is a vast difference between conduct that all nations 
criminalize and international crimes. Uniform condemnation and 
criminalization does not make something an international crime.113 Murder 
and rape, and indeed, most malum in se offenses, are also universally 
condemned, none all fall outside of international law.114 Presumably 
Congress cannot legislate the punishment of purely foreign rapes despite it 
being “universally recognized criminal behavior.” Indeed, the Senate report 
makes no findings that would be relevant to the offense’s being universally 
cognizable, such as the offense being extremely heinous, and beyond the 
bounds of civilized society. Indeed, national drug laws and attitudes vary far 
more than those for murder. 
The status of drug trafficking as found in international custom does not 
raise fine question of whether state practice has become general enough to 
generate a binding norm, or whether the practice is accompanied by opinio 
juris. There simply is no state practice, and a palpable lack of support in 
relevant legal sources. 
 
                                                                                                                            
105 (piracy), with UNCLOS Art. 108. See Michael Tousely, United States Seizure of 
Stateless Drug Smuggling Vessels on The High Seas: Is It Legal?, 22 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L  
L. 375, 399-400 (1990). RESTATEMENT, supra n.3, § 513, comment e; § 521 Reporter's 
notes; and, § 522 comment d. 
110 United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, 1344 n. 6 (S.D. Fla. 1981). 
See also, Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra n.3, at 204-05 & nn. 125-27. 
111 See United States v. Yuosef, 327 U.S. 56, 108 (2d Cir. 2003). 
112 See S .Rep. No. 99-530, at 16 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5986, 6001. 
113 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: 
Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 81 (2001) 
(distinguishing “universality of condemnation” from “universal reach of national 
jurisdiction”). 
114 See Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra n.3, at 206-07. 
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C.  Other International Law Bases for Jurisdiction 
 
The understanding of the Define and Punish clause developed above 
suggests one of two positions regarding the scope of UJ under the clause 
today. The narrow view, one that would be supported by the text and some 
evidence of the original meaning, would limit permanently limit UJ to 
piracy, even if international law develop to include more offenses under 
that category. The broader view would read the clause as authorizing 
extraterritorial jurisdiction offenses over Felonies on the high seas and 
Offenses against the law of nations to the extent that such jurisdiction is 
allowed by contemporary international law. Both positions take the clause 
as incorporating international law by reference. The difference is whether 
such incorporation is static, locked into the 1789 content of international 
law, or dynamic, expanding (or hypothetically, contracting) to track 
international law. 
The narrow view would obviously mean all UJ applications of the 
MDLEA are unconstitutional. Drug trafficking does not in any way 
resemble piracy (far from being robbery, it is sales) and thus it is a 
“felony” and not universally cognizable. The broader view of the clause 
obviously demands a more detailed inquiry into present-day international 
law. The broad view treats “Piracies” as meaning “whatever set of offenses 
the international law of the time treats as universally cognizable.” It has 
been shown above the drug-trafficking is not such an offense.  
Today’s jurisdictional norms are more copious than those of the early 
Republic. Not only are there more UJ offenses, other flexible jurisdictional 
categories have emerged that allow broad extraterritorial, if not universal, 
jurisdiction. Thus in the dynamic view, if drug trafficking has become 
something the U.S. could exercise jurisdiction over without a nexus under 
international law, whether because of UJ or other international 
jurisdictional rules unknown to the Framers, it can be treated as a “piracy” 
for constitutional purposes.  This subpart considers the two possible “non-
UJ” justifications for MDLEA, the statelessness of the vessels, and the 
protective principle of jurisdiction.  
Two caveats: first, all of this is only relevant if one thinks “Piracy,” like 
“Army and Navy” is supposed to track external legal changes. Second, the 
discussion of international law here is not based on a view that it directly 
binds Congress or the U.S. Rather, international law is only relevant 
because Clause 10 explicitly refers to it by using terms of art borrowed 
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Recall that the Marshall court, in a series of piracy cases hat rejected 
UJ over foreign vessels in cases of murder and even classic piracy. 
However, in other cases decided at the same time, the Court held that 
Congress can punish even murder, a non-UJ “felony” when committed on 
stateless vessels, even when there is no U.S. nexus. The vessels in these 
cases were stateless by virtue of “turning pirate.” Thus these cases could be 
understood as accommodating Congress’s desire to punish pirates, 
something potentially endangered by the Court’s holding in Palmer.115  
The international law of the day did treat pirate ships as having lost their 
national character or protection.116  
These decisions may stand for nothing more than a sort of 
supplemental universal jurisdiction, allowing UJ over “felonies” when they 
are part of the same “case or controversy” or “common nucleolus of 
operative fact” as a “piracy.” At the same time, they could stand for a 
broader proposition, that “felonies” can be punished aboard stateless 
vessels, or even more broadly, that the Constitution allows UJ over 
felonies to be as broad as allowable under international law. So if 
international law allows UJ over stateless vessels as part of the law of the 
“high seas,” Clause 10 incorporates this power. 
Several different provisions in the MDLEA allow for UJ.  One of them 
allows for jurisdiction over stateless vessels,117 and UJ over stateless 
vessels is consistent with today’s CIL.118 However, the MDLEA’s 
definition of statelessness goes far beyond what is recognized by 
international custom or convention. The statute defines a “vessel without 
nationality” as one whose claim of registry is denied by their government, 
or that does not claim a nationality, for example, by not flying a flag.119 
The MDLEA also includes vessels where the “nation of registry does not 
affirmatively and unequivocally assert that the vessel is of its nationality.” 
In other words, a properly registered, non-piratical vessel can be treated as 
stateless if the flag state acquiesces, or simply does not reply. Under 
international law, a vessel without nationality is one that is not registered 
by any state, or whose registration involves some subterfuge, such as 
flying multiple flags, or flags of state with which the vessel has no 
                                                 
115 See Kontorovich, Define and Punish, supra n.8. 
116 Though piracy is still universally cognizable, it no longer results in statelessness. 
See UNCLOS Art. 104 (“A ship or aircraft may retain its nationality although it has 
become a pirate ship or aircraft.”). 
117 § 1903(c)(1)(1) (extending jurisdiction to “vessels without nationality”). 
118 See Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d at 824-825. 
119 Id. at (c)(2)(1) –(2). United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1116 (11th Cir.2002) 
(describing vessel on which defendants were arrested as flying no flag and bearing no 
registry or identifying markings). 
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connection.120 The MDLEA’s final “statelessness” provision sweeps 
further than this to include vessels that are properly authorized to fly a 
nation’s flag. This goes beyond what international law recognizes as 
stateless.121 Indeed, it is not a statelessness rule. It is a rule of flag state 
consent or waiver. 
 
2. Protective Jurisdiction. 
 
Several appeals courts have held that the MDLEA can be justified under 
through the “protective principle” of international jurisdiction,122 though 
others have resisted this approach.123 The protective principle is one of 
limited and highly uncertain scope. The courts have given little reason for 
treating the offenses as within protective jurisdiction apart from the fact that 
the preamble to the MDLEA sounds vaguely (but only vaguely) like the test 
for protective jurisdiction. But no treaty law or state practice supports such 
broad jurisdiction over drug offenses, and indeed the cases make little effort 
to show otherwise. 
The principle allows a state to punish extraterritorially “a limited class 
of offenses . . . directed against the security of the state or other offenses 
threatening the integrity of governmental functions.”124 Unlike more 
traditional forms of jurisdiction, no actual harm to these interests need be 
shown. Even more than UJ, the bounds of this jurisdictional theory are 
unclear.125 All commentators stress that the category of protective 
jurisdiction offenses is quite small, and none suggest drug smuggling as one 
of them.  
Indeed, the cases that see the MDLEA as an exercise of protective 
jurisdiction fundamentally misconceive the principle. It applies to conduct 
                                                 
120 See UNCLOS Arts. 91-92; 1958 Geneva Convention on High Seas Arts. 5-6. 
121 See Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d at 825. 
122 United States v. Gonzalez, 311 F.3d 440, 446 (11th Cir. 2203) (holding that 
protective principle authorizes MDLEA, and the Congress invoked that principle in 
statute’s preamble); United States v. Cardalles, 168 F.3d 548, 552 (1st. Cr. 1999) 
(“Application of the MDLEA to the defendants is consistent with the protective principle 
of international law because Congress has determined that all drug trafficking aboard 
vessels threatens our nation's security.”); United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 494 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (“Drug trafficking presents the sort of threat to our nation's ability to function 
that merits application of the protective principle of jurisdiction.”), reversed in relevant 
part by, Perlaza, at 439 F.3d at 1162 (dismissing Peterson as “dicta” and finding protective 
principle insufficient to establish jurisdiction over MDLEA defendants). 
123 United States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1988) (Breyer, J.) (describing as 
“forceful” the argument that protective principle only applies to conduct that threatens U.S. 
specifically, and not the general drug trafficking of the MDLEA). 
124 RESTATEMENT supra n.3, at § 402 cmt. f. 
125 Id. at cmnt. D. 
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that in itself could potentially endanger the security of the United States. As 
the Restatement puts it, the conduct me be “directed against the security of 
the [forum] state.”126 Thus it would have to be shown that the particular 
conduct endangered the U.S. This could obviously not be shown, because 
by stipulation, there is no reason to believe the drugs were destined for, or 
could reach or affect, U.S. markets. The MDLEA courts, however, think the 
protective principle means jurisdiction over conduct of the general kind that 
could endanger the U.S. If some drug trafficking endangers the U.S., the 
courts seem to think all drug trafficking can be reached. 
Moreover, “the security of the state” refers to the safety and integrity of 
the state apparatus itself (its “government operations” or “state interests”), 
not it’s overall physical and moral well-being.127 This is demonstrated by 
the Restatement’s examples: “espionage, counterfeiting of the state's seal or 
currency, falsification of official documents, as well as perjury before 
consular officials, and conspiracy to violate the immigration or customs 
laws.” All these crimes are aimed at or particularly involve the government 
apparatus of the forum state. Needless to say, the protective principle would 
not authorize the U.S. to punish a Ghanan for violating Spanish immigration 
laws or bribing Spanish officials. 
There is no support for the principle reaching moral or victimless 
crimes, and indeed, apparently only one other Western nation casts its 
jurisdiction over drug crimes so broadly.128 Indeed, treating drug crimes as 
within protective jurisdiction would eliminate any difference between it and 
universal jurisdiction. Indeed, it would sweep more broadly than even UJ by 
allowing states to punish relatively minor crimes.  
 
D.  “High Seas” vs. Foreign Waters 
 
The MDLEA, in some of its applications and provisions, may be an 
ultra vires exercise of the Piracies and Felonies power for an entirely 
different reason – it punishes drug crimes even beyond the “high seas.” 
Moreover, the Court has repeatedly warned that jurisdiction over foreign 
vessels in foreign waters would exceed Congress’s legislative competence. 
 
1. The meaning of high seas. 
Clause 10 does not give Congress a general power over extraterritorial 
crimes. Rather, felonies can only be punished “on the High Seas.”129 Unlike 
                                                 
126 Id. 
127 Puttler, supra n.107, at 109.  
128 Id. at 107. 
129 U.N. Convention on the High Seas Art. 1 (1958) (“The term ‘high seas’ means all 
parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal.”). 
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the difference between piracy and felony, this is an express textual 
limitation on the Define and Punish power. Without such a limitation, 
Congress would have a general police power. (The parallel provision, 
“Offenses against the law of nations,” lacks such a limitation, but the class 
of offenses is much narrower than felonies, and the former often involve 
war, which can take place abroad).  
The MDLEA, by its terms, applies to non-U.S. vessels neither on the 
high seas nor in U.S. territorial waters – namely, to “vessel[s] located in the 
territorial waters of another nation.”130 The unconstitutionality of § 
1903(c)(1)(E) is not a major impediment to the MDLEA’s policy, as very 
few cases, if any, are brought under this part of the statue. But many 
applications of the MDLEA’s other sections could potentially be void if 
“high seas” in Clause 10 is read to mean what that term means in today’s 
international law. Recall that because Clause 10 uses many international 
law terms of art, it raises the question of whether their definition is locked 
into the law of 1789, or “updates” to track changes in the law of nations. 
Without updating, only piracy could be punished under UJ, and it would 
take little analysis to show that drug trafficking is not piracy. However, 
allowing updating could also cast doubt on much of the MDLEA. 
In today’s customary international law, as articulated in the United 
Nations Convention on the Law the Sea, the “high seas” begin up to 200 
miles out from shore.131 A great number of MDLEA cases – like the one in 
the example at the beginning of this Article – involve based on conduct in 
this 200 mile area that is neither the “territorial waters” of the foreign state, 
but also not “the high seas.” This Article takes no position on the merits of 
“updating,” which involves fundamental questions of interpretive 
philosophy. However, it does seem that whether one decides to update or 
not, the decision should be consistent at least within Clause 10: if UJ is not 
locked into its 1789 parameters of just “piracy,” it is hard to see why the 
“high seas” should not change with the times as well.  
It would seem there is at least a strong policy case for “updating” here. 
In 1789, territorial waters ended three miles from shore. In territorial 
waters, Congress has plenary power over foreign vessels though the 
admiralty clause. It would be odd to not allow Congress, under its admiralty 
                                                                                                                            
waters of a State 
130 § 1903(c)(1)(E). While such jurisdiction can only be exercised with the foreign 
nation’s consent, this does not change the fact that U.S. drug law is made to apply beyond 
the “high seas” limit of Clause 10. Clause 10 simply does not say “the high seas, or foreign 
territory when the sovereign does not mind.”   
131 Art. 86. Under the UNCLOS regime, waters are no longer territorial or “high.” 
Rather, the new regime recognizes a broad intermediate area, the “exclusive economic 
zone,” where the coastal state has many but not all sovereign rights. This area is explicitly 
no longer treated as part of the high seas regime. See Arts. 55-57. 
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powers, to expand its territorial admiralty power to keep up with the 
maximum allowed by international law. No such proposition has ever been 
suggested. Indeed, the MDLEA assumes total Congressional control over 
territorial waters as defined by today’s international law.  
 
2. Precedents and the admiralty power. 
No case has ever decided the precise question of Congress’s power over 
foreign vessels in foreign waters because prior to the MDLEA, largely 
because the question rarely arises. Indeed, the leading case is eight years 
old. There, the Court endorsed the view that the Define and Punish clause 
did not reach into foreign waters. United States v. Flores concerned a 
murder among the American crew of a U.S. vessel while in Belgian 
waters.132 The defendant argued that the plain text of the Define and Punish 
Clause kept it from reaching conduct in foreign waters. The Court accepted 
this point as self-evident. However, the Court though the prosecution could 
be justified under another congressional power, over the admiralty or 
maritime jurisdiction.133 An examination of the Framers’ intent and drafting 
history lead the Court to conclude that Constitution sought to give the 
federal government all powers within the area of admiralty. The Define and 
Punish power was thus a “supplement” rather than a “limitation” to broader 
admiralty power. The admiralty power could extend in certain 
circumstances even beyond the high seas, and Clause 10 should not be read 
precluding this for felonies or piracies.134 
The Court’s examination of admiralty law lead it to conclude that it 
allowed regulation “of vessels of the United States … while in foreign 
territorial waters.”135 The admiralty law follows the flag. Indeed, it seems 
crucial to the Court’s opinion that the case involved a U.S. ship, as the 
purpose of admiralty is to allow a nation to govern conduct on its vessels, a 
matter in which it has a great interest regardless of where they are.136 Thus 
Flores suggests Congress’s admiralty power could not encompass foreign 
vessels in foreign waters.  
This conclusion is strengthened by the only other discussion of the issue 
                                                 
132 289 U. S. 137 (1933). 
133 The Court inferred from the grant of judicial authority over maritime and admiralty 
cases, see Art. III, § 2, cl. 3, a correlate power of Congress to create the substantive body of 
this law. Flores, 289 U.S.  at 147-48. 
134 Given the breadth of the admiralty power, it is hard to see how the Court’s reading 
would make Clause 10 redundant rather than supplemental. Perhaps its significance lies in 
allowing for common law punishment of high seas offenses, rather than confining such 
cases to the civil regime of admiralty. 
135 Id. at 149-50 (emphasis added). 
136 Id., see also id. at 158 (noting that the case of a foreign vessel would be a “different 
question”). 
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by the Supreme Court. Oddly, though Flores attempted to engage the 
original understanding of Constitution and the 1789 content of admiralty 
jurisdiction, it makes no mention of this case, even though the opinion was 
written by Justice Marshall, who had a much clearer view of the original 
meanings and the nuances of admiralty law. United States v. Witelberger 
involved a killing among an America crew of a vessel on a river 35 miles 
inside China.137 In the circuit court trial, the defendant’s counsel argued that 
applying U.S. law there would exceed Congress’s power over “felonies on 
the High Seas.” The U.S. Attorney conceded the Clause 10 issue. Instead, 
he located congressional authority in the admiralty and maritime power, 
anticipating Flores.138 But he did not argue that admiralty extended beyond 
the high seas into foreign waters. Rather, under standard, internationally-
accepted admiralty principles, it applied to a U.S.-flagged vessel wherever it 
went. It would be “incredible” for such jurisdiction to not be authorized by 
the Constitution.139 Justice Washington, riding on circuit, thought the 
question difficult enough to certify to the Supreme Court, which decided it 
the following year.  
A unanimous Court ruled against jurisdiction, but on the narrowest 
grounds. Through an elaborate reading of the entirely of the Crimes Act of 
1789, Marshall concluded that Congress’s punishment of manslaughter 
“upon the high seas” was intended to have a more encompassed scope than 
the maximum outer limits of the admiralty jurisdiction.140 Thus Marshall 
did not reach the constitutional question, which had occupied almost all the 
argument below. The statutory construction is in his own admission 
somewhat strained, and seems clearly designed to avoid a real constitutional 
difficulty. 
Naturally this did not stop him from offering an extended dictum on the 
constitutional issue. In a lengthy footnote attached to the certificate in the 
case, Marshall suggested the constitutional limits of admiralty extended 
                                                 
137 28 F. Cas. 727, No. 16,738 (C.C. Pa. 1819). 
138 Id. All seemed to agree that the Constitution locks in some historic version of 
admiralty jurisdiction, but given slight difference in the understanding of this jurisdiction in 
different for a, it was unclear what was locked in. The U.S. Attorney argued that the 
Constitution referred to the general principles of admiralty “as generally understood and 
exercised amongst the nations of Europe; and not to the exercise of it at the period when 
the constitution was framed.” Justice Marshall would go on to suggest that it referred to the 
jurisdiction of the British Admiralty, but as the jurisdiction would be translated the 
America – in other words, unburdened by certain statutes limiting jurisdiction over inland 
waterways, which Marshall said were never intended to be applied to the Colonies.  
139 Id. (“There is no civilized nation, with which we are acquainted, where jurisdiction 
over offences committed on board of its own vessels, in foreign ports, would not be 
exercised.”). 
140 United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95-98. 
36 Art. I Horizon [23-Mar-08 
beyond what would strictly be called the high seas.141  But his discussion, 
based on British admiralty practice, strongly implied that foreign vessels on 
foreign waters would be excluded. Thus Marshall at most would be in 
accord with the view of the U.S. Attorney, who saw the constitutionality of 
U.S. jurisdiction as depending entirely on the vessel being American.142  
The Court has long held that the Define and Punish clause has no 
application in foreign waters. Thus these areas, whatever their boundaries 
are today, the MDLEA must depend on the admiralty power. But there is no 
support in history, precedent or current practice for the view that foreign 
vessels within foreign waters are within the jurisdiction of another state’s 
admiralty. Indeed, two centuries of Supreme Court dicta indicate otherwise. 
The scope of U.S. admiralty jurisdiction is generally defined by that of the 
British Admiralty before the Revolution, and that did not go to foreign 
vessels in foreign waters. Thus at least some applications of the MDLEA 
exceed Congress’s powers regardless of what one thinks of the piracies vs. 
felonies issues. But the fact the Congress, in exercising a power over the 
“high seas” included foreign waters might itself suggest that the statute was 
drafted without much thought about Art. I limitations. 
 
 
IV. OTHER SOURCES OF ART. I  POWER  
 
While this Article argues that the MDLEA exceeds the Define and 
Punish power, a statute is constitutional if there is any Art. I basis for it, 
even if it is not the authority that Congress or the courts thought was being 
exercised. This Part considers the most likely alternative sources for 
Congress’s authority.143 (The “admiralty and maritime” power was 
considered and found wanting in Part III.C, as part of the “high seas” 
discussion.) Here the Article considers at some length the treaty power, a 
counterpart in some ways to the “Offenses” power. It also more briefly 
                                                 
141 Id. at 104, n. w. The principal difference is that the admiralty jurisdiction reached 
inland rivers, bays and coastal areas beyond the open seas. The jurisdiction given by the 
Constitution was that of the “admiralty jurisdiction of England, from which ours was 
derived,” though this seems to have referred not to the actual jurisdiction of the Admiral in 
1789, but to some previous, perhaps purer or teleological form. Id. Yet the note clearly 
implies that this jurisdiction, like that of Britain, extended only to waters in U.S. territory. 
142 As late as 1823, a district court found it “not clear” whether Congress’s legislative 
authority extends to a murder on a U.S. vessel in Spanish waters. United States v. Gourlay, 
25 F.Cas. 1382, 1397, No. 15,241 (C.C. N.Y. 1823).  
143 See Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction, supra n.7 at 336 (suggesting that the foreign 
commerce clause and treaty power would likely allow Congress to regulate “even if there 
are some instances in which Article I of the Constitution would not [otherwise] supply 
Congress with authority to enact a statute exercising universal jurisdiction”). 
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discusses the relevance of the foreign commerce clause. The latter is easily 
dismissed. There may be a colorable treaty clause argument, but it would 
have to overcome considerable difficulties, especially since the relevant 
treaty was ratified years after the MDLEA. 
 
A.  Treaty Power 
 
Under the doctrine of Missouri v. Holland, Congress can act outside of 
its otherwise enumerated powers when implementing a treaty.144 However, 
the extent to which a treaty can authorize action otherwise unconstitutional 
remains unclear.145 Certainly Congress cannot violate express guarantees of 
individual rights.146 Under current doctrine, treaties can trump implied 
constitutional constraints such as federalism, but not express ones. (This 
may be an odd result as the enumeration of powers in Art. I was supposed 
to be the major Constitutional protection of individual rights.) The MDLEA 
does not raise any questions of federalism or separation of powers, or 
violate express individual rights.147 Thus under Missouri it would be a valid 
                                                 
144 252 U.S. 416 (1920). Missouri was perhaps a weak case for establishing this 
principle. It involved a migratory bird conservation treaty. Justice Holmes assumed for the 
sake of argument, as lower courts had held, that the hunting of such birds could not be 
reached through Congress’s enumerated powers. But he did not demonstrate this crucial 
proposition, and it is not obvious even under the narrower Commerce doctrine of the time. 
Moreover, if the Foreign Commerce power is broader than the interstate power, it could 
have itself provided a Art. I basis for the statute. 
Interestingly, Commerce Clause arguments played little role in the lower court 
litigation. Instead, the lower courts relied on an earlier Supreme Court decision holding that 
state animal export regulations do not violate the Dormant Commerce clause as meaning 
that wildlife falls wholly outside the scope of the Commerce Clause. Of course the scope of 
permissible state action under the dormant Commerce Clause is not coterminous with 
permissible Congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause. Congress can properly 
regulate many things which, in the absence of such legislation, states can affect through 
their policies.  
145 The debate goes back to the Founding era. For notable contributions to this debate, 
see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867 
(2005) (arguing that Missiouri v. Holland was wrongly decided); Gary Lawson and Guy 
Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Power, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (arguing that treaty clause 
simply authorizes additional method for carrying out powers already granted, and thus 
could not support treaties that go beyond existing federal powers); Curtis Bradley, The 
Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390 (arguing that treaty power 
should not be construed so as to negate federalism). But see, David Sloss, International 
Agreements and the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1963 (2003); 
David Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the 
Nationalist Conception Of The Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000); 
146 See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) ; Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
147 Some have challenged the statute’s UJ provisions on due process grounds, see Part 
I.C.1, supra. Those challenges, which courts have almost entirely rejected, fall outside the 
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exercise of Congress’s authority if “necessary and proper” to some 
treaty.148  The question then is whether there is such a treaty. Certainly the 
legislative history of the act does not mention any treaty basis. Similarly, 
courts have never mentioned the treaty as a source for Congress’s Art. I 
authority, thought they have mentioned it to show that the MDLEA 
complies with international law149 and fairness.150 The courts and Congress 
were right to not invoke the treaty power. For while there arguably is a U.S. 
treaty implicated by the MDLEA – the United Nations Convention Against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances151 – a close 
examination of its provisions and the circumstances of its enactment shows 
it cannot easily be taken as a basis for the MDLEA. 
The provisions of the Convention that specifically contemplate 
MDLEA-type situations do not purport to confer additional jurisdictional 
powers. The Convention’s jurisdictional provision first requires parties to 
take jurisdiction of offenses committed within their respective territorial or 
flag jurisdiction.152 It goes on to encourage, but not require, states to enter 
into agreements with each other authorizing interdiction of drug trafficking 
by each other’s vessels – exactly the kind of arrangements under which 
most MDLEA cases arise.153 
 
1. Bilateral Maritime Agreements. 
Under these bilateral agreements, if both the interdicting and the flag-
state agree, the former may also exercise adjudicative jurisdiction over the 
latter’s nationals arrested in the course of the interdiction efforts.154 The 
Convention does not require any state to exercise such extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. Nor does it authorize it – ultimately, it is the home state’s 
consent that makes prosecution possible, and the home state’s consent 
would have had exactly the same legal effect in the absence of the UN 
Convention. The Convention merely speaks of the possibility of such 
arrangements.155 Thus this provision of the Convention creates no new 
rights or obligations, so it is hard to see how it could be a source of 
additional legislative power for Congress. 
                                                                                                                            
scope of this argument. For purposes of argument, the Article here assumes the MDLEA 
does not violate the Fifth Amendment, and thus could fairly be an exercise of treaty power. 
148 Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction, supra n.7, at 323. 
149 United States v. Bravo, 489 F.3d 1, 8 (1st  Cir. 2007). 
150 Suerte at 377. 
151 (1988); ratified by U.S. in 1990. The Convention has 183 state parties. 
152 Art. 4(1)(a). 
153 See id., Art. 17(4)(c).  
154 See id., Art. 4(1)(b)(ii). 
155 See MURPHY, supra, at 412-13 (describing convention as setting up framework for 
international cooperation but not as criminalizing any conduct). 
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Nor do the Maritime Agreements themselves – the bilateral 
arrangements contemplated by the Convention, and in whose shadow the 
MDLEA prosecutions occur – provide a “Treaty Power” basis for the 
statute. First, most of them are not treaties but rather mere executive 
agreements, entered into by State Department officials with no 
congressional input, let alone advice and consent.156 Even broad defenders 
of the “nationalist” view of Missouri think that unlike treaties, sole 
executive agreements cannot go be the basis for legislation beyond what 
Art. I would otherwise authorize – that is, executive agreements don’t do 
what treaties do under Missouri. Moreover, the Agreements do not confer 
any authority on the U.S. with respect to prosecution. Rather, they simply 
set up rules for cooperation in drug interdiction but they do not authorize, 
let alone require, the U.S. to prosecute.157 
The standard jurisdictional provision states that the flag state, while 
retaining “primary” jurisdiction, “may . . . waive its primary right to 
exercise jurisdiction and authorize the enforcement of United States law 
against the vessel and/or persons on board.” Some agreements go further 
and expressly disclaim giving any jurisdiction to the U.S.158 Simply put, 
these agreements do not give the U.S. any jurisdiction it did not previously 
have. (Indeed, the purpose of the agreements is to facilitate enforcement, 
not prosecution.) 
 This waiver is done on a case by case basis, usually initiated by a State 
Department or Coast Guard request. Often the consent is provided by low-
level functionaries. It may be provided orally, and in some cases, the 
source, form and content of the consent remains obscure.159 Such 
authorization certainly falls short of a formal treaty, or even of an executive 
agreement. Certainly such consent, especially when made in the framework 
of a bilateral agreement and in the shadow of the UN Convention, removes 
any potential international law problems with U.S. jurisdiction. But that 
does not answer the Art. I question. The notion that a mere waiver by 
another nation of its rights at international law can expand the legislative 
competence of Congress goes much further than even the broadest view of 
Missouri v. Holland.160 
                                                 
156 But see Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of the Republic of Colombia to Suppress Illicit Traffic by Sea, Feb. 20, 
1997, T.I.A.S. No. 12835. 
157 The State Department uses a six-part “Model Maritime Agreement,” which covers 
enforcement issues like shipriders, pursuit, overflights, and boarding. Most of the 26 
nations with which the U.S. has such deals have agreed to less than all six parts. 
158 See note 33, supra. 
159 See, e.g., United States. v. Normandin, 378 F.Supp.2d 4, 8 (D. P.R. 2005). 
160 Even if the maritime agreements were to provide a treaty clause hook for the 
MDLEA, they would still leave open the question of those people convicted in the past two 
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Indeed, the bilateral agreements highlight a danger of Holland’s rule 
that Congress can expand its legislative powers through treaty. Generally 
the consent of the foreign state is understood as some kind of check on 
abuses of the treaty power. Foreign states will presumably not enter deals 
just to allow Congress to aggrandize itself. But the U.S. has extraordinary 
bargaining power with respect to most of the nations it has signed bilateral 
maritime agreements with, such as St. Kitts and Nevis, or Dominica.  
Many nations were reluctant to enter agreements which they saw as 
impinging on their sovereign territory or law enforcement functions.161 
Washington, however, threatened these states with substantial aid 
reductions and other economic sanctions if they did not enter the 
agreements.162  Such ultimatums caused quite a bit of bad feeling in 
countries like Jamaica, but have proved ultimately effective.163 Yet it would 
have potentially troubling implications if such purchased treaties could give 
Congress power to do what Art. I had not allowed it.164 
 
2.  Extradite or Punish provisions. 
The strongest Treaty Clause basis for the MDLEA is a provision of the 
Convention contained in the subsequent section of the jurisdictional article, 
that permits but does not require states to punish or extradite offenders 
“present in its territory” but otherwise unconnected to the forum.165 Once 
MDLEA defendants are seized on the high seas by the Coast Guard for the 
purposes of prosecution, they are “present in its territory.” While it is not 
clear the Convention contemplated coerced presence, such factors clearly 
make no difference in U.S. law.166 Still, for purposes of the Treaty Power, it 
matters what the treaty allows. Certainly similar “extradite or punish” 
provisions in other treaties have been held to allow jurisdiction based on 
coerced presence. However, several factors suggest a different answer here. 
                                                                                                                            
decades who were seized on vessels of states with whom the U.S. did not have an 
agreement.  
161 See Statement of Adm. Riutta, supra n.31; Lloyd Williams, The Shiprider 
Agreement: No smooth sailing, Jamaica Gleaner (Feb. 8, 2004), available at 
<http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20040208/cleisure/cleisure2.html>. 
162 See id. (“The dominant view throughout Latin America, the Caribbean and, of 
course, Jamaica, . . . was that Uncle Sam was being his big, bad bullying self, threatening 
that these nations sign a standard agreement, or be de-certified [from a list of nations that 
fight drugs, and thus loose U.S. funding].”). 
163 Joseph E. Kramek, Bilateral Maritime Counter-Drug And Immigrant Interdiction 
Agreements: Is This The World Of The Future?, 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 121, 146 
(2000) (“Some countries feel compelled into signing bilateral maritime agreements with 
the United States.”). 
164 Cf. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
165 Art. 4(2)(b). 
166 Yunis; Ker-Frisbee doctrine 
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The Convention contains particular jurisdictional and substantive 
clauses dealing with joint drug interdiction on the high seas – the provisions 
that prompted the creation of the Bilateral Maritime Treaties. Thus one 
might be hesitant to construe an entirely separate jurisdictional provision, 
4(2)(b), as covering cases where the defendant “is present” in the forum 
state because of the operation of arrangements specifically addressed by 
those clauses. One can read 4(1)(b)(2) as being exclusive of (2)(b). In other 
words, the provisions that discuss jurisdiction over vessels solely govern 
maritime drug smuggling; thus the broader provision would not be 
available. 
This conclusion is strengthened when one reads the Convention 
alongside UNCLOS, to which the narcotics convention explicitly refers.167 
As discussed above, UNCLOS only authorizes UJ over piracy and slave 
trading; for maritime drug trafficking it merely calls for “cooperation.”168 
Because UNCLOS provides a comprehensive set of regulations for 
maritime matters, the drug convention should not be easily read as 
expanding UJ over conduct committed on the high seas beyond what 
UNCLOS allows. Indeed, those provisions of the narcotics convention that 
deal with maritime vessels simply elaborate the content of “cooperation.” 
Thus the broader “extradite or punish” provisions should not be read as 
conferring a separate authority over persons apprehended on the high seas.  
To put it differently, since UNCLOS reflects a deliberate judgment to 
not allow UJ in such cases, interpreting the Illicit Substances Convention as 
authorizing UJ would mean to two treaties conflict. This would be awkward 
for the close to 200 nations that are parties to both treaties.  It would also 
have ungainly consequences for the MDLEA. While the U.S. is not 
currently a party to UNCLOS, despite having signed it, Congress could 
presumably act under the (arguably) broader jurisdictional provisions of the 
Illicit Traffic Convention. Yet if the Senate ratifies UNCLOS, as most 
observers expect it to do very shortly, the last-in-time rule with respect to 
treaties would mean that UNCLOS cuts off Congress’s treaty power to 
authorize the MDLEA. Given the number of nations party to both treaties, it 
seems safest to construe there provisions so as to not conflict. 
 
3. Novel Problems with the Convention as a Constitutional basis.   
Two additional factors, one quite unusual, cast doubt on the Illicit 
Trafficking Convention as a Treaty Power basis for the MDLEA.  Firstly, 
the treaty was drafted and ratified several years after the statute was 
enacted.169 Thus it is no surprise Congress did not see the law as an exercise 
                                                 
167 See Art. 17(1). 
168 See UNCLOS, Art. 108(1). 
169 The U.S. ratified the Convention in 1990. The MDLEA was adopted in 1986, but 
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of the treaty power. Thus at the very least, the Convention does nothing for 
constitutionality of the statute’s UJ provisions ab initio. It is a nice question 
whether an unconstitutional statutory provision can be saved by a 
subsequent treaty.170 Congress’s authority for legislation pursuant to treaties 
is a combination of the Treaty and Necessary and Proper Clause. Even 
though the latter has been given almost limitless scope, it would seem 
fundamentally odd to say that a statute was “necessary” to implement a 
treaty not yet in existence. 
Even when the treaty is subsequently ratified, it is hard to see how an 
existing statute could retroactively become “necessary and proper” to it: 
Congress did not pass the law to implement the treaty. If the law is 
“necessary” to the treaty, that must be determined by a new Congress, one 
contemporaneous with the treaty. Furthermore, it would seem an invitation 
to mischief if Congress could pass a statute that, while unconstitutional at it 
inception, could be automatically resuscitated by subsequent developments, 
like a treaty, constitutional amendment, judicial reinterpretation. In any 
case, if the MDLEA exceeds Art. I powers, the subsequent ratification of 
the treaty could certainly not save convictions and sentences secured up 
until then. 
A second problem with using the Convention to justify the MDLEA lies 
in limitations imposed by the Senate when it ratified the treaty. The U.S. 
entered a declaration that “nothing in this Treaty requires or authorizes 
legislation or other action by the United States of America prohibited by the 
Constitution of the United States.” Such declarations are generally entered 
to limit the constraining effect of a treaty, to avoid international obligations. 
In this case, it could be read as preventing a potentially empowering effect 
of the treaty. If the Constitution can be said to “prohibit” universal 
jurisdiction over non-universal crimes, then the Convention cannot confer 
such a power. A question remains whether “prohibited” is meant simply to 
track the Missouri v. Holland sense of “expressly ruled out,” or in the more 
common sense of not authorized by constitutional law. One might favor the 
latter reading because Senate has since the 1950s attached such declarations 
to treaties specifically because of their discomfort with the broad rule of 
Missouri. With the Illicit Substances Convention, the primary concern 
behind the declaration seems to have been the extradition of U.S. citizens to 
                                                                                                                            
some of its UJ aspects were already present in the Marijuana on the High Seas Act of 1980, 
on which it built. 
170 It is apparently a question of first impression, even in the academic literature. The 
question is not answered by Missouri v. Holland, where Congress passed a second statute 
“pursuant” to the treaty after an earlier one had run afoul in the lower courts: in that case, 
the treaty still preceded the statute. 
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countries that would not afford them due process.171 This does not mean the 
Senators would not have thought the declaration applicable to otherwise 
unconstitutional expansions of Congress’s criminal powers. Most likely, the 
potential UJ issues raised by the Convention escaped their notice.172  
 
B.  Foreign Commerce Clause 
 
One might think the Foreign Commerce Clause could support the 
MDLEA.173 After all, the interstate commerce clause, assisted by the 
necessary and proper power, allows Congress to regulate much that is not 
itself interstate commerce. And perhaps the scope of the foreign commerce 
clause is even broader: since the regulation of foreign commerce is an 
exclusively federal power, it does not run up against federalism principles 
or reserved rights of states. 
However, the MDLEA lies even beyond the foreign commerce power. 
However broad it is, the foreign commerce power does not authorizing 
legislation regarding conduct with no demonstrable and direct nexus with 
the United States. Exactly how much of a connection the conduct must have 
is a difficult question, but one that need not be answered in a UJ case. With 
the MDLEA UJ cases, there is no evidence of any connection to the U.S.  
Not surprisingly, there is little precedent or commentary on this issue.174 
When Congress legislates extraterritorially, as it does with increasing 
frequency, it is almost always because of the foreign conduct’s effect on 
U.S. commerce, not despite it. However, what authority there is clearly 
recognizes a limit to the foreign commerce power, one that UJ legislation 
would exceed. One of the earliest and most significant discussions of UJ, 
flatly rejected using the foreign commerce power as a substitute for the 
Define and Punish power: 
Rather than relying on Congress's direct authority under Art. I Section 8 
to define and punish offenses against the law of nations, the government 
                                                 
171 See Statement of Sen. Helms, 135 Cong. Rec. S16615-01, S16617, 1989 WL 
189698.  
172 The Attorney General’s description of the jurisdictional provisions to the Senate did 
not mention UJ at all, and indeed, his discussion of its extraterritorial affect implied it 
would not allow UJ. See Statement of Dick Thornborough, id. at S16619 (“Parties may 
establish jurisdiction over offenses committed by their nationals, committed on board 
vessels outside their territorial waters which are properly boarded and searched, and with 
respect to conspiratorial offenses committed outside their territory with a view to 
commission of a covered offense within their territory.”). 
173 Cf. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction, supra n.7, at 336 (“[A]t least some invocations 
of the universal jurisdiction concept by Congress are likely to involve situations in which 
there are effects on foreign commerce--for example, the disruption of shipping lanes or air 
traffic due to piracy.”). 
174 See id. 
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contends that Congress has authority to regulate global air commerce under 
the commerce clause. . . . Congress . . . is not empowered to regulate foreign 
commerce which has no connection to the United States. Unlike the states, 
foreign nations have never submitted to the sovereignty of the United States 
government nor ceded their regulatory powers to the United States. 175 
 
Thus courts in MLDEA case have entirely disclaimed the commerce clause 
as a basis for the law.176  
The question of UJ and the Foreign Commerce clause was recently 
discussed at some length by Prof. Colangelo. He concludes: 
 
The text of the Foreign Commerce Clause along with what we know 
about the founders’ beliefs regarding state sovereignty and attendant rules of 
jurisdictional non-interference lead persuasively to the conclusion that for 
Congress to act extraterritorially under the Clause, the conduct it seeks to 
regulate must exhibit a direct connection to U.S. commerce.177 
 
This is not the place to recapitulate Prof. Colangelo’s able exposition of 
the arguments. Briefly, the text of the clause suggests that the commerce 
must be “with” the U.S. The Constitution does not use the term “among” 
that it uses for “commerce among the states.”178 This shows that it is not 
enough for the commerce to be between some foreign states. Rather, the 
U.S. must be on one side of the transaction. Moreover, the Framers’ 
territorial concepts of jurisdiction make it highly improbable that they 
intended to give Congress plenary power to legislate over all global 
economic activity.179 Nothing in the purposes of the Commerce Clause 
suggest such a power. Consider the kinds of laws Congress can pass under 
its interstate commerce powers. Surely it would be odd to think the 
Constitution empowers Congress to legislate safety conditions for Yemeni 
shoe repairmen, or regulate backyard wheat production or prostitution in 
Pakistan. 
To continue the reductio ad absurdum, if one thought the Foreign 
Commerce power to be as robust as the domestic one, it would imply the 
                                                 
175 Yunis, 681 F .Supp. at 907 n.24. See also, United States v. Georgescu, 723 F. Supp. 
912, 918 (E.D. N.Y. 1989) (observing that Foreign Commerce clause gives Congress 
power “to criminalize activities affecting our foreign commerce”). 
176 See Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d at 825. 
177 Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: 
Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
121, 147 (2007). 
178 Id. at 148-49. 
179 Id. at 149-51. Furthermore, to the extent the protections of the Bill of Rights, such 
as the Takings Clause, do not apply to foreigners abroad, Congress’s power to legislate for 
foreign countries could exceed its power to legislate domestically, a counterintuitive result. 
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existence of a Dormant Foreign Commerce clause – a power of federal 
courts or Congress to strike down foreign laws that burden international 
commerce. Such a power has never been suggested, because of the 
fundamentally different nature of domestic intrastate commerce from purely 
foreign commerce. This shows that one cannot simply export doctrine from 




Congress has almost never used its Define and Punish power to punish 
conduct with no connection to the U.S. The first time it did so, in 1790, the 
Supreme Court narrowly interpreted the law to avoid constitutional 
difficulties. Soon after, Congress steered a statute clear of a much-desired 
UJ provision because of similar doubts. One hundred sixty years later, 
Congress ventured back into the poorly chartered-waters of UJ with the 
MDLEA – and ran afoul of shoals.  
In general, the Constitution does not empower Congress cannot legislate 
for foreigners in international waters or abroad. If Congress could do so, its 
powers would be unlimited. There is an exception to this for piracy, 
stateless vessels, and perhaps other areas where international law allows UJ. 
But Congress cannot by fiat make something a UJ offense when CIL does 
not treat it as such. To paraphrase Furlong, if by calling drugs smuggling 
piracy, Congress could assert jurisdiction over an offense committed by a 
foreigner in a foreign vessel, what offence might nor be brought within their 
power by the same device? Surely Congress could not regulate dueling on 
foreign vessels, as Justice Marshall put it. 
Most applications of the MDLEA that do not involve a U.S. nexus 
exceed Congress’s Define and Punish power. That only authorizes Congress 
to regulate conduct that either has some direct relation to the U.S., or is 
universally cognizable in international law. (In an narrower and quite 
plausible view of the clause, piracy is the only offense to which UJ can 
attach). Drug trafficking is not a UJ offense; nor does it fall under the 
similarly far-reaching protective principle of jurisdiction. Moreover, the 
MDLEA extends to vessels in foreign countries exclusive economic zones, 
and even in their territorial waters. This violates the clause’s explicit 
limitation to crimes on the “high seas.”  
There is a difficult argument to be made for the MDLEA as legislation 
pursuant to a treaty, if one takes a sufficiently broad view of what 
“necessary and proper” to a treat is. However, the use of the treaty power to 
sustain the statute would depend on several other difficult and untested 
propositions, such as Congress being able go beyond its Art. I powers in 
pursuance of non-mandatory (i.e., aspirational or permissive) treaties, and 
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of treaties not yet on the books when the law is enacted.  
However, there may be sections of the MDLEA that have some basis in 
the traditional understanding of the Felonies power. In particular, the 
MDLEA’s application to stateless vessels (as defined in international law) 
may be consistent with the Felonies power as it has been applied in the only 
Supreme Court decisions dealing with such issues. 
 
 
 
  
 
